FedUpUSA

Archive for the ‘bonds’ Category

As everyone is engrossed by assorted groundless Christmas (and other ongoing bear market) rallies, and oblivious to the debt monsters hiding in both the closet and under the bed, Zero Hedge has decided it is about time to present the ugliest truth faced by our ‘intellectual superiors’ and their Wall Street henchman who succeeded in pulling off Goal #1 for 2009 – the biggest ever bonus season (forget record bonuses in 2010… in fact, scratch any bonuses next year if what is likely to transpire in the upcoming 12 months does in fact occur).

If someone asks you what happened in 2009, the answer is simple – two things. There was a huge credit and liquidity crunch, and then there was Quantitative Easing. The last is the Fed’s equivalent of band-aiding a zombied and ponzied corpse, better known as the US economy. It worked for a while, but now the zombie is about to go back into critical, followed by comatose, and lastly, undead (and 401(k)-depleting) condition.

In 2009, total supply of all USD denominated fixed income, net of maturities, declined by $300 billion from $2.05 trillion to $1.75 trillion. This makes sense: the abovementioned crunches stopped the flow of credit from January until well into April, and generally firms were unwilling to demonstrate to the market how clothless they are by hitting the capital markets until well into Q2 if not Q3. What happened was a move so drastic by the Fed, that into November, the worst of the worst High Yield names were freely upsizing dividend recap deals (see CCU) – the very same greed and stupidity that brought us here. Luckily, so far securitization and CDOs have not made a dramatic entrance. They likely will, at which point it will be time to buy a one-way ticket for either our southern or northern neighbor, both of which, in the supremest of ironies, transact in a currency that will survive long after the dollar is dead and buried.

Back to the math… And here is the kicker. Accounting for securities purchased by the Fed, which effectively made the market in the Treasury, the agency and MBS arenas, but also served to “drain duration” from the broader US$ fixed income market, the stunning result is that net issuance in 2009 was only $200 billion. Take a second to digest that.

And while you are lamenting the death of private debt markets, here is precisely what the Fed, the Treasury, and all bank CEOs are doing all their best to keep hidden until they are safely on their private jets heading toward warmer climes: in 2010, the total estimated net issuance across all US$ denominated fixed income classes is expected to increase by 27%, from $1.75 trillion to $2.22 trillion. The culprit: Treasury issuance to keep funding an impossible budget. And, yes, we use the term impossible in its most technical sense. As everyone who has taken First Grade math knows, there is no way that the ludicrous deficit spending the US has embarked on makes any sense at all… none. But the administration can sure pretend it does, until everything falls apart and blaming everyone else for its fiscal imprudence is no longer an option.

Out of the $2.22 trillion in expected 2010 issuance, $200 billion will be absorbed by the Fed while QE continues through March. Then the US is on its own: $2.06 trillion will have to find non-Fed originating  demand. To sum up: $200 billion in 2009; $2.1 trillion in 2010. Good luck.

As we pointed, the number one reason why 2010 is set to be a truly “interesting” year is a result of the upcoming explosion in US Treasury issuance. Fiscal 2010 gross coupon issuance is expected to hit $2.55 trillion, a $700 billion increase from 2009, which in turn was  $1.1 trillion increase from 2008. For those of you needing a primer on the exponential function, click here. But wait, there is a light in the tunnel: in 2011, gross issuance is expected to decline… to $1.9 trillion.

And while things are hair-raising in “gross” country (not Bill…at least not yet), they are not much better in netville either. Net of maturities, 2010 coupon issuance will be about $1.8 trillion, a 45% increase from the $1.3 trillion in FY 2009 (and the paltry $255 billion in 2008).

Now everyone knows that the average maturity of the UST curve has become a big problem for Tim Geithner: nearly 40% of all marketable debt matures within a year (a percentage that has kept on growing). In fact, the Treasury provided guidance in its November 2009 refunding, in which it stated that it intends “to focus on increasing the average maturity” of its debt after relying heavily on Bill issuance in H2. Once again, we wish Tim the best of luck.

Why our generous best intentions to the US Treasury? Because unless the US consumer decides to forgo the purchase of the 4th sequential Kindle and buy some Treasuries (and not just any: 30 Year Bonds or bust), the presumption that the Bond printer will have the option of finding vast foreign appetite for its spewage is a very myopic one. We already know that China is a major question mark, and will aggressively be looking at pumping capital into its own economy instead of that of Uncle Sam’s – at some point the return on investment in its own middle class will surpass that of funding the rapidly disappearing US middle class. That tipping point could be as soon as 2010.

As for Japan – the country has plunged into its n^th consecutive deflationary period. Whether or not the finance minister announces yet another affair with the Quantitative Easing whore on any given day, depends merely on what side of the bed he wakes up on. The country will have its hands full monetizing its own sovereign issuance, let alone ours.

Lastly, the UK – well, with the country set to have zero bankers left in a few months, we don’t think the traditionally third largest purchaser of US debt will be doing much purchasing any time soon.

None of this is merely speculation: October TIC data confirmed these preliminary observations. It will only become more pronounced in upcoming months.

How about that great globalization dynamo: emerging markets? Alas, they have their hands full with issuing their own record amounts of both sovereign and corporate debt as well: in 2009 gross EM debt issuance reached an astounding $217 billion, $29 billion higher than the previous record in 2007. Gross EM issuance was particularly high in the last quarter at $73 billion, with October breaking the record for the largest ever monthly gross issuance of emerging market global bonds at $38 billion (January is traditionally the busiest month of the year.) With $81 billion, 2009 was notably a record year for sovereign bonds, while gross issuance of corporate bonds amounted to $136 billion, the second highest level after that of 2007 with $155 billion.

Bottom line: everyone has major problems at home, and is more focused on the supply than the demand side of the equation.

What options does this leave for the administration? Very few, and all of them are ugly. As we stated earlier on, the options for the Fed are threefold:

1. Announce a new iteration of Quantitative Easing. This will be met with major disapproval across all voting classes (at least those whose residential zip codes do not start with 10xxx or 068xx), creating major headaches for Obama and the democrats which are already struggling with collapsing polls.
2. Prepare for a major increase in interest rates. While on the surface this would be very welcome for a Fed that keeps hinting that deflation is the biggest concern for the economy, Bernanke’s complete lack of preparation from a monetary standpoint (we are surprised the Fed’s $200 million reverse repos have not made the late night comedy circuit yet) to a forced interest rate increase, would likely result in runaway inflation almost overnight. The result would be a huge blow to a still deteriorating economy.
3. Engineer a stock market collapse. Recently investors have, rightfully, realized there is no more risk in equities, not because the assets backing the stockholder equity are actually creating greater cash flow (as we demonstrated recently, that is not the case), but simply because taxpayers have involuntarily become safekeepers for the entire stock market, due to Bernanke’s forced intervention in bond and equity markets. Yet the President’s Working Group is fully aware that when the time comes to hitting the “reverse” button, it will do so. Will the resultant rush into safe assets be sufficient to generate the needed endogenous demand for Treasuries is unknown. It will likely be correlated to the size of the equity market drop.

If the Fed decides on option three, we fully believe a 30% drop (or greater) in equities is very probable as the new supply/demand regime in fixed income becomes apparent. We hope mainstream media takes the ideas presented here and processes them for broader consumption as indeed the Fed is caught in a very fragile dilemma, and the sooner its hand is pushed, the less disastrous the final outcome for investors. Then again, as Eric Sprott has been pointing out for quite some time, it could very well be that the US economy has become merely one huge Ponzi, and as such, its expansion or reduction on the margin is uncontrollable. We very well may have passed into the stage where blind growth is the only alternative to a complete collapse. We hope that is not the case.

Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays to all readers.

Submitted by Leo Kolivakis, publisher of Pension Pulse.

Henny Sender of the FT reports that top hedge funds bet on big rise in yields:

The
recent rise in long-term US interest rates comes as good news for
several leading hedge fund managers, including John Paulson, who have
positioned their trading books to benefit from higher yields on US
Treasury securities.

 

Mr Paulson, who
made big gains earlier this decade by betting against the subprime
mortgage market and whose firm, Paulson & Co, manages $33bn, has
said he believes that government stimulus efforts would inevitably lead
to higher inflation and a corresponding rise in rates.

 

“It will
be difficult for the government to withdraw the economic stimulus,” Mr
Paulson said in a speech. “An increase in the monetary base leads to an
increase in the money supply, which leads to inflation.”

Bond
prices fall as yields rise, and Mr Paulson told the Financial Times
last week that he has been hoping to benefit in the Treasury market by
buying options that would become profitable if rates headed higher.
TPG-Axon’s Dinakar Singh has been making similar options trades,
according to a person familiar with the matter.

Julian Robertson,
the hedge fund manager, has pursued a related strategy, hoping to
benefit from a bigger difference between short-term and long-term
interest rates, known as a steeper yield curve, a person familiar with
his trades said.

The yield on the 10-year Treasury, which hit a
crisis low of 2.055 per cent last year, has moved from 3.2 per cent
last month to 3.75 per cent on Tuesday.

Hedge fund managers,
however, have been hesitant to engage in short sales of Treasury bonds
to profit from the rising yields – and falling prices – because of the
Federal Reserve’s heavy involvement in the market. This has led some to
buy options – dubbed “high strike receivers” – that would enable them
to profit from sharply higher Treasury yields, hedge fund managers say.
These trades, which are relatively cheap to execute because they are so
out of the money, are based on the thesis that yields could hit 7 or 8
per cent.

“If they are right, and the world ends, they will make
a fortune,” said one fund manager who is sceptical of the idea. “If
they are wrong, they haven’t lost much.”

Some traders are
cautious because many peers lost large sums betting that rates would
rise in Japan in the 1990s – as yields fell to less than half a
percentage point. The trade was termed the “black widow” because it left so many victims.

“Nobody
understood the extent of deflation and economic weakness in Japan,”
said Dino Kos of Portales Partners, a research consultancy, who was
then a Fed official. “More money was lost on that trade than on any
other single trade. Everyone piled in when rates were at 3 per cent and
then at 2.5 per cent and then at 2 per cent.”

So
is it time to place big bets on rising yields? I could easily see a
backup in yields in the near term as economic reports surprise to the
upside, but I don’t believe that bonds have entered a long-term secular
bear market. I think the hedgies are right, best to play interest rate
directional calls though options.

Also, given the increase in
liability-driven investing by pension funds worried about their funding
status, there is an upper cap on bond yields. I don’t know what the
exact magic number is, but at a certain level (say 7%), you’ll have
pensions scambling to lock in rates. Bond bears tend to ignore this
when predicting doom and gloom on bonds. All they do is focus on the
“pending collapse” of the US dollar, which won’t happen .

I keep trying to warn people…..

LONDON, Dec 16 (Reuters) – Standard & Poor’s on Wednesday put about 1.46 trillion euros ($2.127 trillion) worth of covered bonds on credit watch negative or developing, based on new criteria for rating such securities.

$2.12 trillion worth of covered bonds?!

What is a covered bond again?

Covered bonds, usually rated triple-A, are regarded as low risk because they are backed by mortgage assets or loans that remain on the issuing bank’s balance sheet, but the credit crisis prompted S&P to revisit the way it rated them because of concerns over what would happen in a bank default.

Oh, mortgages and loans eh?

“AAA” eh?

Is this sort of “AAA” the same sort that our subprime MBS got?

So let’s see.  Instead of selling the loans we keep them and then sell bonds against them, thereby “covering” them with the “asset.”  This works great until the underlying collateral quality goes to hell and the borrower defaults, at which point the bondholder has recourse against the issuing bank!

When that issuing bank is geared at 60:1 (as some in Europe are) guess what happens?

This is the definition of “AAA” right?  A bank that is geared up 30, 40, 50, 60:1 – and that’s the ultimate recourse on the bond? 

How do you say “debt pyramiding” – an act that every competent underwriter or credit analyst knows is a serious risk?  But no!  We should rate this eurotrash “AAA” so we can find suckers, er, “investors”, who will soak up this trash and make even more risky lending possible!

I think we need a new rating: TOP – for “Triple Ocular Penetration” (thanks to the forum but I can’t find the person’s login to credit him or her properly :-> ) – and we should definitely assign these “covered bonds” this new rating.

Oh and these crafty bankers would never get themselves into a duration mismatch problem would they?  You know, sell short-term bonds against 20 or 30 year loan obligations – thereby putting them at risk of a rollover problem (where rates have spiked in the interim), making them instantly underwater (and remember, they’re levered 30, 40, 50 or 60:1 over there – with no transparency – too!)

The bonds have relatively short maturities, but the pool of underlying mortgages backing them are usually 25-30 years. This raised concerns that in a default the mortgages would not raise enough to repay the bonds.

Oh, they did do that.  Geez these bankers are really smart!

“Heh sonny, hold this thing for me while I pull the pin out…. and RUN!”

All the pumpers and media shills tried to tell us that the problems were behind us, and the economy and banking system would all be ok….. let’s see, we have the PIIGS problem, we have Dubai, and now we have over $2 trillion of supposedly-”AAA” bonds that not only are the epitome of debt pyramiding but they’ve got duration mismatch problems – into an almost-certainly rising-rate environment – as well!

What could possibly go wrong?

Courtesy of David Rosenberg of Gluskin-Sheff

It’s that time of the year when ‘sell-side’ research departments publish their Year-Ahead Reports (as I once did in the not-too-distant past); as do all the financial magazines.

I realized after countless emails and phone conversations (in that order) that there is a very high expectation that I publish one too. I honestly have no intention of publishing a specific set of forecasts in my current role as the Chief Economist and Strategist for Gluskin Sheff for public consumption — the granularity of my recommendations is reserved for our Investment team and our client base. Be that as it may, I am more than happy to comment on what I see as an emerging consensus and my general view on the direction of the economy and the markets in the coming year without getting into too much detail or numerical forecasts, which are the domain of the ‘sell-side’ macro teams globally.

At the outset, let it be known that when I read everyone else’s year-ahead prognostications, all I can think of is, “where do I store this stuff for a year so I can look back and say ‘That was so wrong!’.” It’s not that the reports are always bullish every year; it is that they seem so contrived. And, as I mentioned in the December 10th edition of Breakfast with Dave, this year, probably like most years, there seems to be a remarkable level of agreement. Based on my reading, here is what I conclude the consensus views are as we head into 2010:

• Muted recovery, but positive growth, for sure! No risk of a ‘double dip’.
• Equity markets up!
• A barbell strategy of domestic multinational blue chips and emerging market equities.
  The U.S. dollar is…neutral, but we did locate more bulls than bears (so much for the ‘carry trade’ thesis).
• Positive on commodities for the most part.
• Concerned about government balance sheets, and therefore…
• …Bearish on long term government bonds because they are the ‘competition’ and, after all, who would tie their money up for 10 years at 3.5% when you can lose 22% in stocks? And, therefore…
• …Bullish on spread product (as long as it’s not long-term). And, therefore…
• …Really comfortable with high yield (just for the coupon and the view that default rates will come down).
• Certain that volatility will not be an impediment.
• The Fed will begin to raise rates in the second half of the year, but that this will have no impact since they will still be low.

So here we are with a glorious opportunity to reintroduce Bob Farrell’s Rule 8: “When all forecasts and experts agree, something else is going to happen.”

That being said, these economists and strategists, many of whom I know, are smart guys (and gals) and they are human. To ‘talk your book’ is human; to have the courage to ‘buck the consensus’ is divine. I too am human; I also like to feel that I have courage of my convictions; and I too have a “book” (of sorts — it’s called reputation). But I have decided to take the opportunity of the “Year-Ahead Moment” to transition from sell-side to buy-side and more importantly, to reflect on the past year and really try to prognosticate from the gut. You would be surprised how a blend of intuition and experience can make a difference in a cycle like the one we are in that has absolutely nothing in common with the other recessions of the post-WWII era.

Forecasting is a humbling profession even in the best of times and I have learned a lot in the past year, especially from my partners here at Gluskin Sheff who realizes all too well that:

1. It is what is embedded in asset prices benchmarked against the forecast that is of utmost importance for investors;
2. The focus of any forecast must take into account the reality that minimizing portfolio risks is at least as critical as maximizing the returns, and;
3. Every forecast has an error term and the range around any projection in a post-bubble credit collapse can be extremely wide.

I do not view the economic events of the last two years as a classic recession/recovery phase. They only exist in the context of a secular credit expansions and contractions. We are in a post-credit bubble credit collapse that is ongoing, à la Bob Farrell’s Rule 4: “Exponential rapidly rising or falling markets usually go further than you think, but they do not correct by going sideways.”

Mainstream economists called this downturn “The Great Recession”. This is truly a gentle way of saying “Depression”. When we can have the courage to come to grips with the fact that we did in fact experience a depression of sorts, which is by definition a credit event, then and only then can we draw a conclusion that a sustainable recovery will not get underway until the ratio of household credit to personal disposable income reverts to the mean (and goes to an excess in the opposite direction). I know it sounds harsh, but we shall endure — believe it. Transition is rarely without pain.

The ratio of household debt to disposable income is up from a 30% ratio back in the 1950s to 125% today (though down from 139% at the peak in 2007). Mean reverting to a ratio closer to 60% means that the deleveraging process will be a multi-year event and by the time it is over, more than $7 trillion in additional household credit will have to be extinguished. For more on this see the unbelievably grotesque article on the front page of last Thursday’s (December 10) Wall Street Journal — The New American Dream.

Perhaps inflation is a consensus forecast but deflation is the present day reality and often lingers for years following a busted asset and credit bubble of the magnitude we have endured over the past two years. The fact that China’s voracious appetite for basic materials will continue to exert upward pressure on commodity prices does not detract from this view, especially given the widespread excess capacity in the manufacturing sector and the new frugality that has gripped, and in many cases, been embraced by the retail sector. Higher raw material prices, owing to developments in Asia as opposed to demand pressures here at home, will prove to be a sustained source of profit margin compression for many sectors and companies linked to finished consumer goods and services.

So, much of what I have read in various Year-Ahead Reports predict corporate earnings, GDP growth here and abroad, interest rates and relative values of currencies. As I mentioned earlier, the error term is bound to be very wide in this new paradigm (since WWII) of a secular credit collapse. GDP growth in 1934 was 10%, but the Depression wasn’t over until 1940.

Since 1989, the Japanese stock market has had no fewer than four 50%-plus rallies and there still has been no period of growth that can be called a sustained expansion. Today, we have our own special set of conditions and it is bound to be tricky as is typical during a post-bubble credit collapse, no matter how intense the government reaction. Prematurely committing to the ‘risk’ trade is probably going to be the most lamentable action over the next few years.

Suffice it to say, we believe that the dominant focus will be on capital preservation and income orientation, whether that be in bonds, hybrids, hedge fund strategies, and a consistent focus on reliable dividend growth and dividend yield would seem to be in order. To reiterate, I see the range of outcomes in the financial markets and the economy to be extremely wide at the current time. But one conclusion I think we can agree on is the need to maintain defensive strategies and minimize volatility and downside risks as well as to focus on where the secular fundamentals are positive such, as in fixed-income and in equity sectors that lever off the commodity sector.

This, in turn, underscores my primary focus of favouring Canadian dollar based investments over the U.S. because at no time in my professional life have the downside risks — economic, fiscal, financial and political — been so low on a relative basis and the upside potential so high as is the case today. The near-2,000 basis point gap this year between the TSX and the S&P 500 — the former leading — should be taken in the context of being just past the halfway point of a secular (ie, 16-18 year) period of outperformance. Northern exposure never felt this hot.

I’d give the 30 year auction today a big fat stinking “F”…

The so-called yield curve touched 373 basis points, the most in at least 29 years, as the bonds drew a yield of 4.52 percent, compared with an average forecast of 4.483 percent in a Bloomberg News survey of five of the Federal Reserve’s 18 primary dealers.

Mediocre demand Bloomberg goes on to say…..

Uhhhhh… no.

That might have something to with this from Politico:

In a bold but risky year-end strategy, Democrats are preparing to raise the federal debt ceiling by as much as $1.8 trillion before New Year’s rather than have to face the issue again prior to the 2010 elections.

“We’ve incurred this debt. We have to pay our bills,” House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer told POLITICO Wednesday. And the Maryland Democrat confirmed that the anticipated increase could be as high as $1.8 trillion — nearly twice what had been assumed in last spring’s budget resolution for the 2010 fiscal year.

America the subprime borrower.

Make no mistake – this is pushback.  “We” didn’t incur this debt Steny, you and your pals did.  Remember, Steny, America said by a more than 100:1 margin NO to TARP.  You passed it anyway.

You dished out over $1.4 trillion in trash last year, and are $300 billion in the hole in two months this year – already.  For the math-challenged that’s $1.8 trillion for this fiscal year, if your profligacy continues.

Go ahead, boyz, try to bail everyone out that’s a Wall Street bigwig.  Keep it up – the bond market will take care of you soon enough, and America will go “bang” – literally.

Oh, I’m not the only one saying it either.  Nor is it just “bears” like Roubini.  Try Australia’s opposition finance spokesman Barnaby Joyce:

THE OPPOSITION finance spokesman, Barnaby Joyce, believes the United States government could default on its debt, triggering an ”economic Armageddon” which will make the recent global financial crisis pale into insignificance.

Senator Joyce told the Herald yesterday he did not mean to alarm the public but there needed to be a debate about Australia’s ”contingency plan” for a sovereign debt default by the US or even by a local state government.

They’re already making contingency plans down under….. is it time to short the US government – and should we go long baskets?

Just curious.

I spoke with some friends who are Greek and also in the shipping
business. They hate the problems that Greece is facing. The 12.7%
budget deficit is the highest in the EU and is not sustainable. Efforts
to cut government expenses have caused a political backlash against PM
Papandreou. The only available solution is to raise taxes and crack
down on tax evaders.

The Shippers are largely untaxed on their global operations. Their
status is ‘protected’ under the constitution. Taxing the shippers would
go a long way toward closing the budget gap. The changes in tax laws
will not come easy. There is no certainty of the outcome. The sense
that I got from these discussions was that there is a short window open
for Greece to come up with a plan to cut its deficit to approximately
9%. I asked for both a ”good” and a “bad” news scenario. Although the
responses to the question I asked are speculation, they have
interesting implications.

“If Greece is able to restructure its tax code and install a
plan to reduce its deficits to 8% of GDP, then China will invest Euro
25 billion in Greek bonds.”

The issue of the Chinese investing in Greece was first raised on November 29 by the WSJ.
I think it was one of those well placed rumors. If this were to happen,
it would be of significance. It would establish that China is assuming
a role as some form of ‘lender of last resort’. The bilateral trade
conditions that would be attached to a deal of this magnitude would
re-raise the issue of China’s trade hegemony and economic muscle. For
me, the most significant aspect of this is that it would represent yet
another significant diversion of China’s investable funds away from the
US.

If this were to happen, the $40 billion under discussion would not
impact the supply demand equation for US debt. But the direction of
this would be significant. The US desperately needs China to
significantly increase their holdings of US IOU’s in the coming years.
They are under no obligation to do so. What if they were to take a
stance with the US similar to Greece? We would get a headline that
looked like:

Of course we are not going to see a headline like that anytime soon,
but the developments in Greece are a possible first step in that
direction. If China bails out Greece in 2010 it is a game changer from
a number of perspectives.

“If Greece is unable to address its budget deficit the Chinese
will not invest and financial conditions for the country will
deteriorate quickly. One consequence would be that Greece would be
forced to separate from the Euro.”

This is not a high probability outcome. However, talk of  it would have
a very significant impact on the FX markets. The people who I spoke
with made an interesting observation, “Switzerland
is very much integrated with the EU and the Euro, but they have
maintained their own currency. If Greece had its own currency it could
adjust it to achieve a trade advantage that would address the
fundamental imbalances.” (Same argument as “the weak dollar is good
for the USA”). These same people point to the fact that the Swiss
National Bank has been intervening in the currency market to weaken the
Swiss Franc in order to achieve a trade advantage. The thinking is, “If it works for the Swiss, then Greece should do it too!”

Consider where this could go. If there is talk of this happening, it
would raise the same issue for Spain and Italy who are suffering from
their association with they Euro. This could lead in the direction of a
two-tiered Euro. One would be strong. The other weak. The implications
for the dollar would be significant in both the short and long term. It
could be the source of instability as the process unfolds.

The Greece story has already gotten the money moving. It is a story
that could take us in some surprising directions. I got the sense that
there was a short fuse on this. The next three months may put some
powerful forces into play.

Is there anything behind the Chinese/Greece connection? I think so. I
always assume there is something to it when you get statements like the
following. Asked whether Greece is negotiating with China to sell
bonds, a government spokesman said:

“It may be true, and if it is true, we do not want to comment. But even if it isn’t true we wouldn’t want to comment.”