FedUpUSA

Archive for the ‘Economic Recovery’ Category

Submitted by James Bianco of Bianco Research

•    The Wall Street Journal – Fed Proposes Tool to Drain Extra Cash
The Federal Reserve on Monday proposed selling interest-bearing term deposits to banks, a move the U.S. central bank would make when it decides to drain some of the liquidity it pumped into the economy during the financial crisis. The new facility is intended to help ensure that the Fed can implement an exit strategy before a banking system awash with Fed money triggers inflation. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has described term deposits as “roughly analogous to the certificates of deposit that banks offer to their customers.” Under the plan, the Fed would issue the term deposits to banks, potentially at several maturities up to one year. That would encourage banks to park reserves at the Fed rather than lending them out, taking money out of the lending stream.The central bank said the proposal “has no implications for monetary policy decisions in the near term.” “The Federal Reserve has addressed the financial market turmoil of the past two years in part by greatly expanding its balance sheet and by supplying an unprecedented volume of reserves to the banking system,” it said. “Term deposits could be part of the Federal Reserve’s tool kit to drain reserves, if necessary, and thus support the implementation of monetary policy.” Michael Feroli, an economist at J.P. Morgan Chase, said “it’s another step forward in the exit-strategy infrastructure, but it’s been well flagged in advance, so it’s not a surprise.” When Fed officials decide to tighten credit, they would likely use the term-deposits program ahead of — or in conjunction with — adjusting their traditional policy lever, the target for the federal funds interest rate at which banks lend to each other overnight. The Fed also said Monday that its balance sheet rose slightly to $2.2 trillion in the week ending Dec. 23. The Fed’s total portfolio of loans and securities has more than doubled since the beginning of the financial crisis. As part of its efforts to fight the downturn, the central bank is buying $1.25 trillion in mortgage-backed securities, a program it says will end in March. The Fed now holds $910.43 billion in mortgage-backed securities, it said Monday.

•    Bloomberg.com – Fed Proposes Term-Deposit Program to Drain Reserves
The Federal Reserve today proposed a program to sell term deposits to banks to help mop up some of the $1 trillion in excess reserves in the U.S. banking system.  The plan, subject to a 30-day comment period, “has no implications for monetary policy decisions in the near term,” the central bank said in a statement released in Washington. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke is preparing tools and strategies to shrink or neutralize the inflationary impact from the biggest monetary expansion in U.S. history. Central bankers are also conducting tests of reverse repurchase agreements and discussing the possibility of asset sales. Term deposits may help the central bank “assert operational control over the federal funds rate” once officials decide to lift the overnight bank lending rate from the current range of zero to 0.25 percent, said Lou Crandall, chief economist at Wrightson ICAP LLC in Jersey City, New Jersey. Excess cash “would be locked up” rather than put downward pressure on the federal funds rate, he said.The Fed won’t begin raising interest rates until the third quarter of 2010, according to the median estimate of 62 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News in the first week of December.

•    The Financial Times – Fed to offer term deposits to banks
The US Federal Reserve plans to offer term deposits to banks as part of its “exit strategy” from the exceptionally loose monetary policy used to fight the recession. In a consultation paper released on Monday the Fed said it planned to change its rules so that it could pay interest on money locked up at the central bank for a defined period. The Fed added that the well-flagged rule change – designed to allow it more influence over the $1,100bn in excess reserves held by banks – was part of “prudent planning. . . and has no implications for monetary policy decisions in the near term”. It is one of a number of measures that has been outlined over the past few months by Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Fed, as an option to drain liquidity from the financial system in a manner that protects the economic recovery while heading off the threat of inflation.

•    The Federal Reserve – Notice of proposed rulemaking; request for public comment.
The Board is requesting public comment on proposed amendments to Regulation D, Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, to authorize the establishment of term deposits. Term deposits are intended to facilitate the conduct of monetary policy by providing a tool for managing the aggregate quantity of reserve balances. Institutions eligible to receive earnings on their balances in accounts at Federal Reserve Banks (”eligible institutions”) could hold term deposits and receive earnings at a rate that would not exceed the general level of short-term interest rates. Term deposits would be separate and distinct from those maintained in an institution’s master account at a Reserve Bank (”master account”) as well as from those maintained in an excess balance account. Term deposits would not satisfy required reserve balances or contractual clearing balances and would not be available to clear payments or to cover daylight or overnight overdrafts. The proposal also would make minor amendments to the posting rules for intraday debits and credits to master accounts as set forth in the Board’s Policy on Payment System Risk to address transactions associated with term deposits.

Comment

We believe the proposal of this new tool signals the Federal Reserve is still flailing around trying to look busy so everyone is assured they have a plan.  The fact is they have no plan and are still throwing everything on the wall to see what sticks. From the November 4 FOMC minutes:

Participants expressed a range of views about how the Committee might use its various tools in combination to foster most effectively its dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability. As part of the Committee’s strategy for eventual exit from the period of extraordinary policy accommodation, several participants thought that asset sales could be a useful tool to reduce the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and lower the level of reserve balances, either prior to or concurrently with increasing the policy rate. In their view, such sales would help reinforce the effectiveness of paying interest on excess reserves as an instrument for firming policy at the appropriate time and would help quicken the restoration of a balance sheet composition in which Treasury securities were the predominant asset. Other participants had reservations about asset sales–especially in advance of a decision to raise policy interest rates–and noted that such sales might elicit sharp increases in longer-term interest rates that could undermine attainment of the Committee’s goals. Furthermore, they believed that other reserve management tools such as reverse RPs and term deposits would likely be sufficient to implement an appropriate exit strategy and that assets could be allowed to run off over time, reflecting prepayments and the maturation of issues. Participants agreed to continue to evaluate various potential policy-implementation tools and the possible combinations and sequences in which they might be used. They also agreed that it would be important to develop communication approaches for clearly explaining to the public the use of these tools and the Committee’s exit strategy more broadly.

The Federal Reserve first hinted at term deposits almost two months ago, although exactly what they were talking about was left vague until now.

Remember that the Federal Reserve has to withdraw over a trillion dollars of excess liquidity.  The easiest way to do this is to sell hundreds of billions of MBS, Treasuries and agencies.   As the bold highlighted passage above implies, they are scared to death of doing this, so they propose complicated schemes to withdraw liquidity like reverse repos and now term deposits.

We have argued that these schemes will not work.  They cannot be done in the sizes necessary or enough to even matter.  The Federal Reserve could possibly drain tens of billions of dollars via these schemes, but collectively that will amount to a rounding error when the goal is to withdraw over a trillion in excess reserves.

The Federal Reserve does not want to admit defeat, so they continue pursuing these strategies that will not make a difference.  We believe they also do it to “look busy” as they are taking measurements and notes as to how to withdraw all the liquidity they have pumped in.  They think this will give the market comfort that someone is on the case and that inflation expectations will not get out of control.  The market is not buying this.  Inflation expectations, s measured by TIPS inflation breakeven rates, are going vertical.

Reinvestment Risk

As to term deposits, the Federal Reserve is proposing an illiquid short term instrument for banks to invest in.  Banks would buy these instruments and “lock up” the excess reserves they now have.  This would have the same effect as draining excess reverses.  The maturities of these instruments would be as long as one year.

It is unclear if there will be a secondary market for these instruments, and if so, how liquid it will be.
Without a secondary market, buyers of these instruments face huge reinvestment risk.  The future course of short term interest rates is arguably to the most uncertain it has been in decades.  Will the Federal Reserve stay near zero until 2012 or will they be forced to raise rates in the first half of 2010?  Given all this uncertainty, who wants to lock up money in something that cannot be sold before maturity?  This is especially true given the Federal Reserve’s statement that the “maximum-allowable rate for each auction of term deposits would be no higher than the general level of short- term interest rates.”

The general level of short-term interest rates is set on known instruments that have generations of history and active secondary markets.  If the Federal Reserve wants to introduce a new, and wholly unknown instrument with an uncertain secondary market and offer no interest rate premium, then we cannot see how this will work beyond a token amount after some arm twisting to get them sold.  The Federal Reserve will have to offer a premium for uncertainty and illiquidy to make this fly in any major way, something they said they will not do.

Complicated Is Simple

The Federal Reserve owns 80% of AIG.  With each passing day it looks like the Federal Reserve is adopting AIG Financial Product’s business practices.  That is, when faced with a financial problem, they create complicated tools (like CDS).  When critics says these new products will not work, tell them they do not know what they are talking about and create even more complicated tools to dazzle everyone.  Once the tools are so complicated that no one understands them, you will be hailed as an expert with no peer.  You might even be named TIME’s Person of the Year.

From The Daily Capitalist.

Dear Santa:

Since you give away stuff for free, I hope you aren’t a socialist and ignore my wish list during the annual potlach. By the way, it seems that the Obama Administration is way ahead of you in giving out free stuff to everyone. I hope you can catch up.

I think I’ve been a pretty good boy this year. I have regularly bitten my tongue in my commentary so as not to be accused of being a flamer. I don’t think I’ve defamed anyone. And I try to write as much original material as possible to avoid being labeled a “scraper” (lifting stuff off the Net and publishing it under my own name). And, I haven’t sold out my opinions for mere money. For a blogger, that’s a pretty good record.

Here’s my wish list. I couldn’t find where to post it on Amazon, so here goes:

1. Kill The Bill

No, not the Uma Thurman thing. I’m talking about the health care “reform” bill going through Congress right now. If your magical powers extend that far, please put economic sense into our politicians’ collective heads that government control over the system is not a way to “save money” or create “efficiency.”

2. Put in the Fix

Instead of eliminating market forces in health care, please convince Congress to fix it by peeling back the convoluted rules and regulations that have screwed it up in the first place. Suggest these four little things we could try first that actually would work, save billions, and cover more people:

Give Medicare enrollees a voucher and the freedom to choose any health plan on the market;

Give workers control over their health care dollars with “large” health savings accounts which would allow them to purchase secure health coverage from any source;

Break up state monopolies on insurance and allow insurance companies to compete across state lines; and

Block-grant Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program to prevent massive waste and encourage states to target resources to the truly needy.

3. Turn the Sausage Makers into Sausage

I understand it’s Christmas and it would be kind of negative to wish political ill fortune on someone, but, there’s this especially despicable sentator, Ben Nelson, that I would like for you to arrange to catch him with a hooker or taking a bribe. Whatever you think would work, Santa. Make sure there are tapes. I have lots more names, but I’d be happy with Ben.

4. Firing Suggestions

Please arrange for Obama to fire Ben Bernanke, Larry Summers, Timmy Geithner, and Christina Romer.

5. Hiring Suggestions

To replace the above, how about Ron Paul at the Fed, and the following economic advisers: Walter Block, Russ Roberts, and Joseph Salerno. They are all fine economic scholars and would steer our President in the right direction.

6. Freeze Congress

Don’t let Congress pass any more bills until they’ve all read, and discussed with the No. 5 guys, Economics in One Lesson by Henry Hazlitt, the best little book on economics, ever. Televise it.

7. Bring Back the Real Constitution

Please have Obama appoint strict constructionists to the Supreme Court. Nominees who understand natural law, and that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments actually mean something. Maybe we’d get our individual sovereignty back.

8. Make Work is No Work

Let Mrs. Pelosi and Mr. Reid see the folly of the American American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, a useless $787 billion bill that is nothing other than intergenerational theft. Someone has to pay for it and I’m afraid it will be my children, grandchildren, and ten generations of my great-grandchildren.

9. Beautiful Sunsets

Require Congress to sunset every spending law they pass. You know how they promise that a program will be very effective and that it will only cost so much? Make them prove it, say every two years. If the bill fails to cure the perceived ill, get rid of it. If the program exceeds its budget, get rid of it. It will also provide us with a handy voting guide at election time.

10. Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom

Sprinkle some free market magic dust on the economics departments of our major universities. Maybe that will help the sheep break from Keynesian orthodoxy and actually begin to think.

Thank you, Dear Santa. I’m forever hopeful.

Econophile

From The Daily Capitalist

As my readers know, every so often I really get fed up with what comes out of Washington (Our Nation’s Capital) and feel the need to vent. My recent irritation is a letter Christina Romer, the president of Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, published in the Wall Street Journal.

The letter is an apologia for the economic policies she and Summers and Geithner have been recommending to the president. She seems like such a nice lady, and she’s the wife of economist David Romer. Both were econ professors at Berkeley and both studied economics at MIT. But …

Here are some excerpts from her letter, with my comments:

Within a month of taking office, the administration had announced its Financial Stability Plan and signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The Recovery Act helped stem the decline in spending caused by consumers and businesses reeling from the fall in asset prices and the drying up of credit. Real GDP, which had fallen at a 6.4% annual rate in the first quarter of 2009, began to grow again just two quarters later. …

She seriously believes this. But she has a slight problem with the cause and effect, post hoc ergo propter hoc*, thingie. That is, there is no evidence, theoretical or empirical, that the Recovery Act did anything positive or lasting. Even assuming Keynesian stimulus works, the government hadn’t spent enough money to make it work according to the Keynesian formula. At least that’s what Paul Krugman said. Whatever, no one has ever offered any proof that such stimulus works.

And, as far as I know, PCE (consumer spending) is still very low, asset prices are still declining, and credit is worse.

We’ve already seen from the Recovery Act that spending on infrastructure—everything from roads and bridges to schools and municipal buildings—is an effective way to put people back to work while creating lasting investments that raise future productivity. …

Yadda, yadda, yadda. Again more spending on things the government wants, not the things that the market wants. The jobs are already fizzling. See this excellent article in the WSJ, ironically published on the same day as Mrs. Romer’s piece. The gist is that when the government money ends, the jobs dry up.

Subsequently the president pushed for the Cash for Clunkers program that was successful in boosting demand and job creation. …

All this did was to junk a bunch of good cars, fill the pockets of auto dealers, and appease the UAW. Auto sales are already declining again. It just accelerated future sales of people who would have bought cars anyway.

[A]bout a month ago the president announced the latest in a series of measures to encourage banks to lend to small businesses. …

As we all know credit is still shrinking, not growing. They have tried every trick in the Keynesian book to loosen credit but to no avail. I’m sure this new legislation will be different.

[I]n early November the president signed into law a measure that would provide relief and spur job creation by adding additional weeks of unemployment insurance, cutting taxes for businesses, and expanding and extending the home-buyer tax credit. …

That must have worked really fast, because unemployment, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, dropped from 10.2% to 10% in November. Wow, that’s great legislation. But, as we all know, Things Are Not What They Seem. As David Rosenberg pointed out in one of his reports, the government stats look funny because they are so different from what ADP reported. 

Despite these positive developments, the job market remains very weak. … American businesses appear hesitant to hire, and are producing more with fewer workers. …

Didn’t she just say that things are getting better?

Tomorrow [the President] will convene a meeting of business and labor leaders, small-business owners, economists and community representatives to discuss our ideas and solicit others for accelerating hiring. … [W]e need to harness the private sector, bringing large and small firms in off the sidelines to boost job creation. …

This is the part that really upset me. First, this is a typical political move. “Let’s all get together and come up with some great ideas!” No offense to the community organizers out there, but getting a bunch of people in a room like this gets nowhere. The best thing they could do is cancel all meetings, and get the hell out of the way.

But what really got me was the “harness the private sector” comment. I hope she didn’t mean it in the way I’m thinking, but if she didn’t then it’s even worse because she doesn’t realize the implications of her policies. When government gets together with business and labor to create policies for political benefit, it is called fascism, or national socialism. The words she used were rather telling: a “harness” is not something I would want to be in. You know who has the whip.

While the words seem innocent, it is all about losing our freedoms. Here’s the conclusion from a piece I wrote about the takeover of GM (in homage to Ayn Rand):

Sometimes it’s hard to see what is happening in front of your eyes. It seems rather benign and logical when you read about it, but it’s not. Nationalizing GM is just good old fashioned fascism–just like what happened in Italy in the 1920s and ‘30s … And now us. If you think I’m exaggerating, it’s probably because you think everything the government does is OK because we’re having a crisis. As Wesley Mouch said in Atlas Shrugged, “We’ve got to act!” That’s how we are losing our freedom, by a thousand cuts.

*Since that event followed this one, that event must have been caused by this one.

Treasury Department Releases Text of Letter from Secretary Geithner
to Hill Leadership on Administration’s Exit Strategy for TARP

WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury released the
text of identical letters sent today from Secretary Tim Geithner to
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senator Harry Reid outlining the
Administration’s exit strategy for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) established by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA). The text of the letter to Speaker Pelosi follows.

December 9, 2009

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker          
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Speaker:

I am writing to update you on the status of the Obama
Administration’s financial policies, including programs initiated under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) established by the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), the results they have
achieved, the challenges ahead, and our plan for exiting TARP.

These policies are working.  When the Obama Administration took
office, the financial system was extremely fragile and the economy was
contracting sharply.  The Administration’s financial and economic
policies have helped to shore up confidence in our financial system. 
Credit is starting to flow again to consumers and businesses, and the
economy is growing.  Further, private capital is replacing public
capital in our major institutions.

As a result of improved financial conditions and careful stewardship
of the program, losses on TARP investments are likely to be
significantly lower than previously expected.  We now expect a positive
return from the government’s investments in banks.  These banks will
soon have repaid nearly half of the TARP funds they received.  We also
expect to recover all but $42 billion of the $364 billion in TARP funds
disbursed in FY2009.  Further, we plan to use significantly less than
the full $700 billion in EESA authority.  As a result, we expect that
TARP will cost taxpayers at least $200 billion less than was projected
in the August Mid-Session Review of the President’s Budget.

But significant challenges remain.  Too many American families,
homeowners, and small businesses still face severe financial pressure. 
Although the economy is recovering, foreclosures are increasing, and
unemployment is unacceptably high.  Businesses are still cautious in
the face of uncertainty about the strength of the recovery, and many
small businesses face very difficult credit conditions.  Although bank
lending standards are starting to ease, many categories of bank lending
continue to contract.  This contraction has hit small businesses very
hard because they rely heavily on such lending, and do not have the
ability to substitute credit from securities issuance.  Commercial real
estate losses also weigh heavily on many small banks, impairing their
ability to extend new loans.

Further, the recovery of our financial system remains incomplete. 
And near-term shocks to that system could undermine the economic
recovery we have seen to date.

Exit Strategy for TARP

Our exit strategy for TARP balances the mandate of EESA to address
these challenges with the need to exercise fiscal discipline and reduce
the burden on current and future taxpayers.  There are four broad
elements to our strategy.

First, we will continue terminating and winding down many of the
government programs put in place last fall.  In September, Treasury
ended its Money Market Fund Guarantee Program, which guaranteed at its
peak over $3 trillion of assets.  The program incurred no losses, and
generated $1.2 billion in fees.  The Capital Purchase Program, through
which the majority of TARP investments in banks have been made, is
effectively closed.  Before this Administration took office, nearly
$240 billion in TARP funds had been committed to banks.  Since January
20, we have committed about $7 billion to banks, much of which went to
small institutions.  Major U.S. banks subject to the “stress test”
conducted last spring have raised over $110 billion in high-quality
capital from the private sector.  And banks will soon have repaid $116
billion of TARP funds

Second, we will limit new commitments in 2010 to three areas.

• We will continue to mitigate foreclosure for responsible American
  homeowners as we take the steps necessary to stabilize our housing
  market.
• We recently launched initiatives to provide capital to small
  and community banks, which are important sources of credit for small
  businesses.  We are also reserving funds for additional efforts to
  facilitate small business lending.
• Finally, we may increase our commitment to the Term
  Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which is improving
  securitization markets that facilitate consumer and small business
  loans, as well as commercial mortgage loans.  We expect that increasing
  our commitment to TALF would not result in additional cost to taxpayers.

Beyond these limited new commitments, we will not use remaining EESA
funds unless necessary to respond to an immediate and substantial
threat to the economy stemming from financial instability.  As a nation
we must maintain capacity to respond to such a threat.  Banks are still
experiencing significant new credit losses, and the pace of bank
failures, which tend to lag economic cycles, remains elevated.  At the
same time, many of the Federal Reserve and FDIC programs that have
complemented TARP investments are ending.  This creates a financial
environment in which new shocks could have an outsized effect –
especially if an adequate financial stability reserve is not
maintained.  As we wind down many of the government programs launched
initially to address the crisis, it is imperative that we maintain this
capacity to respond if financial conditions worsen and threaten our
economy.  However, before using EESA funds to respond to new financial
threats, I would consult with the President and Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board and submit written notification to the Congress.  This
capacity will bolster confidence and improve financial stability,
thereby decreasing the probability that it will need to be used.  This
is the third element of our exit strategy.

In order to accomplish these goals, pursuant to Section 120(b) of
EESA, I certify that I am hereby extending the authority provided under
the Act to October 3, 2010.  This extension is necessary to assist
American families and stabilize financial markets because it will,
among other things, enable us to continue to implement programs that
address housing markets and the needs of small businesses, and to
maintain the capacity to respond to unforeseen threats, as described
above.

While we are extending the $700 billion program, we do not expect to
deploy more than $550 billion.  We also expect up to $175 billion in
repayments by the end of next year, and substantial additional
repayments thereafter.  The combination of the reduced scale of TARP
commitments and substantial repayments should allow us to commit
significant resources to pay down the federal debt over time and slow
its growth rate.

Even with this extension, we expect that TARP will cost taxpayers at
least $200 billion less than was projected in the August Mid-Session
Review of the President’s Budget, including $25 billion in potential
costs from new TARP commitments in 2010.  We expect that the vast
majority of these potential costs would come from mitigating
foreclosure for responsible American homeowners as we take the steps
necessary to stabilize our housing market.

The final element to our exit strategy is how we manage equity
investments acquired through EESA while protecting taxpayers.  We will
continue to manage those investments in a commercial manner and seek to
dispose of them as soon as practicable.  We will exercise our voting
rights only on core issues such as election of directors, and we will
not interfere in the day-to-day management of individual companies.  In
addition, as the steward of taxpayers’ funds, Treasury will continue to
manage investments in a manner that ensures accountability,
transparency and oversight.  And we will work with recipients of EESA
funds and their supervisors to accelerate repayment where appropriate. 
We want to see the capital base of our financial system return to
private hands as quickly as possible, while preserving financial
stability and promoting economic recovery.

History suggests that exiting prematurely from policies designed to
contain a financial crisis can significantly prolong an economic
downturn.  We must not waver in our resolve to ensure the stability of
the financial system and to support the nascent recovery that the
Administration and the Congress have worked so hard to achieve. 
Improvements in the financial performance of EESA programs put us in a
better position to address the economic and financial challenges many
Americans still face.  I look forward to continuing to work with you to
achieve these
goals.                                                               

Sincerely,

Timothy F. Geithner

Identical copy of this letter sent to:
            The Honorable Harry Reid

cc:       The Honorable Barney Frank
           The Honorable Spencer Bachus
           The Honorable David Obey
           The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Submitted by Thought Offerings

With S&P 500 earnings reporting mostly (98%) complete for Q3 2009, it’s time for an update to the charts from Dividends, Earnings, and Stock Price Trends have Tracked the Great Depression.

The
following chart compares the decline in twelve month trailing earnings
and dividends since the stock market peaked in October 2007 to the same
measures following the stock market peak in September 1929:

Earnings have dropped more rapidly than during the Great Depression (dramatically so if you count reported rather than operating earnings), but they appear to have begun a recovery much sooner than occurred back then. Trailing 12-month dividends are still falling slightly faster than during the Great Depression, which is particularly remarkable given how much more severe deflation was then compared to now. These trends underscore that contrary to some claims, this is no crisis of confidence!

Since
dividend changes tend to lag earnings changes, rising earnings could
mean dividends will level out and start increasing soon (and in fact
the quarterly fall in dividends from Q2 to Q3 was small). However, if
earnings are being over-reported thanks to factors such as relaxed
accounting rules or optimistic loan loss assumptions, dividends should ultimately reveal the truth about underlying cash flows.

And
while we should all hope that this recovery can be sustained, there is
a significant probability (details of which I hope to discuss in a
separate post) that this is a temporary upturn in a longer term depression. A renewed fall in GDP, persistent unemployment, and intensifying deflationary pressures would not be good news for any fledgling recovery in earnings and dividends.

Here
is a chart comparing the dividend yield today with the Great Depression
trend. Yields are much lower today and are trending down again despite
the significant upward yield trend back then. So is this a genuine
early economic recovery, or a sign that the modern stock market tends
to be a capital-gain seeking momentum machine with little regard for
underlying fundamentals? Yes, interest rates are low, but they were
back then too, and David Rosenberg suggests most current corporate bond
yields are a lot more attractive than yields of the same companies’
stocks.

The next chart compares price/earnings ratios earnings during the Great
Depression with today using reported earnings. There is no comparison.

It is clear that the market has accepted Wall Street’s encouragement to ignore reported earnings when valuing stocks,
so here is the same price/earnings chart using operating earnings (for
the recent trend — the measure had not been invented back then):

The P/E ratio based on operating earnings has soared above 25 just as
it did at a later stage during the Great Depression. I just wish I had
more confidence that this was the start of an earlier sustainable
recovery rather than a sign of the irrationality of markets and reckless myopia.

Note:
All of these charts use Robert Shiller’s monthly stock data (with a
single representative stock price for each month), not daily prices.

From The Daily Capitalist
December 3, 2009

Since the biggest financial collapse in world history was built on credit related to housing, it is pretty obvious that we should be paying very close attention to that market. The reasons are complex, but a recovery must be based on the liquidation of bad debt. The sooner that happens the quicker a recovery will happen.

When we mean “liquidation of debt” we are talking about a mountain of credit built on the housing bubble. This phony bubble wealth permeated the entire economy. When home owners saw the price of their home rising, they saw it as a source of capital to use for a variety of things, but let’s face it, most people spent it.

New stores opened, malls were built, financial institutions grew, cars and boats, second homes, vacations, and restaurants all flourished. Credit card debt mushroomed. Home mortgages were increased to pull cash out for spending. Yes, some of it went to good things, like our children’s education, helping our aged parents, and paying off bills. But the reality was that our debt kept growing.

The clever lads created even more phony wealth under the guise of insurance, but as we found out, companies like AIG really had no idea how large their obligations were for credit default swaps written against almost any financial risk. And these instruments were further leveraged without understanding the magnitude of these triple-counted obligations or their relationship to housing.

It all comes back to housing as the fuel for the 70% of our economy that was consumer spending. The thought was that housing has always gone up, and if it went down, it really never went down if you averaged growth since the post-WWII-period. A drop of 10%? Never has happened. 20%? Not even a 6th deviation possibility.

My thesis has been that this was all fueled by the Fed through monetary policies that created and supported the bubble. Aided and abetted by governmental policies and financing schemes that favored housing and risky loans. This was not a “free market” phenomenon. Far, far from it.

My thesis has also been that we can’t recover until all this bad debt is liquidated, and capital generated by savings is created and ultimately invested in profitable enterprises. It would be a mistake to rekindle the bubble. But, as we know, that’s what our government is trying to do. The government creates uncertainty as it flails around with programs, spending, and debt schemes to revive the economy. As a result mark-to-market accounting is thing of the past and banks are guarding their balance sheets, corporations are sitting on a lot of cash, cutting costs, and becoming leaner, and Mr. and Mrs. America still favor savings and debt instruments over equities and spending.

The big question: is the housing market bottoming out? Because once it does, debtors and debt holders will then have a handle on how great their losses are. When the bottom is falling out, it is difficult to get lenders to lend if they are afraid their remaining cash reserves will be needed to shore up the bank because of loan losses. The holders of subprime debt find it difficult to value their assets while housing values are still dropping.

Lenders have been shepherding their cash, reducing debt obligations, and cutting back lending and new investments because they do not know how deep their hole will be until housing bottoms out. Keynes called this a “liquidity trap.” More reasonable people, especially the Austrian school economists, call this a reasonable and necessary response to uncertainty.

The Fed and the federal government have been flogging this liquidity trap issue without let up and basically credit is still drying up. A 0.25% Fed Funds rate is basically a negative rate and they still can’t get banks to lend. The Fed’s balance sheet is at a record high. They have bought $850 million of mortgage backed securities. They are injecting cash into lenders. They have basically suspended mark-to-market accounting.

In Q3, the FDIC reported that bank lending still contracted by 3%:

Loans and leases held by U.S. commercial banks have declined for 10 straight months, falling to $6.7 trillion as of Oct. 28 from $7.2 trillion at the end of 2008, according to a separate statistical release from the Fed.

 

Commercial and industrial loans have dropped to $1.37 trillion from $1.6 trillion, commercial real-estate loans have declined to $1.66 trillion from $1.72 trillion, and consumer loans have fallen to $847 billion from $857 billion at the end of last year.

What do banks do? They have decided they would rather hold Treasury paper instead of make loans. This chart shows what’s been happening. No wonder T-rates have stayed so low despite massive deficit financing.

This is what makes Bernanke, Geithner, and Summers lose sleep at night. “It’s supposed to work, dammit!” Maybe this is why Summers is always falling asleep. No matter what they’ve tried, they can’t get banks to lend. I think they are very worried about this and while they say the economy is recovering nicely, they are crossing their fingers at the same time.

Back to housing.

I have been saying that I think the housing market is finding a bottom. I thought that low prices and rising affordability was the main driver of the housing market. If this were so, then housing prices would reflect real market valuations and this would finally bring about the liquidation of assets and debt wastefully invested during the prior artificial credit cycle. Lenders would know where they stood financially and would liquidate bad assets and rebuild their balance sheets. No more waiting around wondering what the Fed or the government would do to save housing.

I was wrong.

The housing market I now believe is being sustained almost entirely by the Fed and the federal government. This rekindling of the housing bubble is counterproductive and will hinder a real recovery of the economy because an artificially backed market will delay the necessary liquidation of the prior cycle’s malinvestment of capital.

Here is why I changed my mind:

First, 59% of new home buyers are relying on government-backed FHA, the Veterans Administration, and the Department of Agriculture loans. Most of these sales are driven by the first-time home buyers tax credit. The tax credit program has been extended through April, 2010.

Second, existing home sales are being driven by the tax credit and by foreclosure and short sales. Existing home sales are up 10.1%. Distressed sales — mainly foreclosures and short sales — accounted for 30% of transactions in the third quarter. And. according to the NAR, home sales are being driven by first time home buyers trying to make the previous November deadline.

This will have a negative impact on future sales. Like Cash for Clunkers, these government-driven sales may just be eating into sales that would have occurred in 2010. Many economists are referring to this phenomenon as “payback.”

Third, mortgage rates are now at 30 year lows. Another Fed related gift to home buyers. The average 30-year mortgage rate was 4.95% in October, down from 5.06% in September, according to Freddie Mac. Today, Freddie said the rate was down to 4.7%.

But … home prices are still falling. The S&P/Case-Shiller index of prices fell 8.9% for the July-through-September period from a year earlier. That was an improvement from the 14.7% drop in the second quarter and the 19% decline in the first three months of 2009. Median prices of existing homes fell in 123 of 153 metropolitan areas during the third quarter compared with a year earlier. The national median price was $177,900, down 11.2% from the third quarter of 2008. [Don't ask me to explain the disparity. Case-Shiller and NAR measure this differently.] Last month the median price for an existing home was $173,100, down 7.1% from $186,400 in October 2008.

Thus, despite record interference in the housing market by the government, home prices are still falling. There are several reasons why it is likely that home prices will continue to fall.

Almost 25% of home owners are upside down with their mortgages. Nearly 10.7 million households had negative equity in their homes in the third quarter, according to First American CoreLogic. This shadow market is huge:

Home prices have fallen so far that 5.3 million U.S. households are tied to mortgages that are at least 20% higher than their home’s value, the First American report said. More than 520,000 of these borrowers have received a notice of default, according to First American. …

 

But negative equity “is an outstanding risk hanging over the mortgage market,” said Mark Fleming, chief economist of First American Core Logic. “It lowers homeowners’ mobility because they can’t sell, even if they want to move to get a new job.” Borrowers who owe more than 120% of their home’s value, he said, were more likely to default.

 

Mortgage troubles are not limited to the unemployed. About 588,000 borrowers defaulted on mortgages last year even though they could afford to pay — more than double the number in 2007, according to a study by Experian and consulting firm Oliver Wyman. “The American consumer has had a long-held taboo against walking away from the home, and this crisis seems to be eroding that,” the study said.

This overhang will continue to drive prices down. There is no way the Feds can force lenders to modify enough loans to make a serious dent in this overhang. It’s imply too big. Eventually the losses from forced modifications will mount and the FHA or any other agency will not be able to pay off their guarantees to lender. Nor should they try.

Mark Zandi, who correctly predicted a crisis in the housing market, but not the Crash, said on Wednesday, “The housing crash is not over.” He said the lull in foreclosure sales for the past few months, due to the government’s pressure on lenders to modify loans, has resulting in higher prices. He expects Case-Shiller to bottom by Q3 2010 with an overall price decline of 38% (now at 32%).

“Foreclosure sales will increase, and home prices will resume their decline by early 2010 as mortgage servicers figure out who will not qualify for a modification,” he said.

 

Zandi said 7.5 million foreclosure sales will have taken place between 2006 and 2011. The majority of these sales, however, have not emerged yet, with 4.8 million foreclosure sales expected between 2009 and 2011.

What this means is that the housing supply, now down to a 7+ months supply, will rise again, and prices will continue to decline. We haven’t seen the bottom yet.

The economy is so hot, that democrats in Congress are now moving with yet another stimulus package, this one for $170 billion, targeting bankrupt states and formerly surging unemployment (Obama has some TV appearances today; the BLS will be back to its previously scheduled job collapse next month). In other news, Japan did approximately 10 such small scale bailouts even as its market proceeded to keep probing new lows over the last two decades, and as reinvested 3x its annual GDP in comparable such one-time boosts to the economy without doing anything to prevent its current deflationary collapse.

From Dow Jones:

Congressional Democrats are moving ahead with a roughly $170 billion package to spur jobs growth and boost emergency  assistance to the unemployed, Democratic congressional aides say.

The two separate bills are taking shape amid an improving jobs picture, but with unemployment still at 10%. U.S. President Barack Obama will deliver a speech Tuesday at the Brookings Institution where he intends to lay out his own ideas for a narrowly targeted jobs bill, which will overlap with  Congress’s intentions but won’t be identical.

Both the administration and Congress will almost certainly pay for part of their program with some of the $115 billion that bailed out banks have repaid to the Treasury Department.

Some more details on Krugman’s wet dream:

The legislation will likely be split in two. The first part, at around $110 billion, would be considered emergency spending. It would again extend unemployment insurance, food stamp increases and a provision in the stimulus bill that subsidizes private-health insurance for the unemployed. This portion will likely be attached to a giant spending bill this month to fund the federal government, and will be added to the already huge U.S. budget deficit.

A second “jobs” bill would cost up to $70 billion, funded by the bank bailout. It would include more money for highway and bridge building, school construction and repair, and water and sewer projects. A second component would be direct aid to state governments cutting back services and raising taxes, moves that are hurting the economic recovery.

Finally, some repaid bailout funds will be lent back to small businesses directly from the Treasury.

Of course, nobody will have the brilliant idea of actually using TARP repayments (before they are needed to bail out the banking system again some time in late 2010) to actually pay back some of the debt which as of a few months ago has been classified as “unmanageable” by everyone including Mr. Bernanke. But why care about the sovereign default in 4-6 years when there are mid-term elections to be worried about. At least in the meantime, the abovementioned Fed Chairman can teach us all we need to know about Fiscal responsibility, courtesy of a completely “apolitical” and transparent Federal Reserve.

By Economic Forecasts & Opinions

Stock markets around the world cracked on Friday with the Dow Jones industrial average down more than 150 points (Fig. 1), and commodities plunging as Dubai debt woes unnerved investors, and sent tremors of uncertainty throughout all markets.

The crisis flared after Dubai, a part of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) federation, asked to delay interest payment for six months on $60 billion of debt issued by the state-run conglomerate Dubai World and its main property unit Nakheel.

Concerns that a government-backed investment company risked default ripped through world markets. Investors read it as a sign of yet another sovereign implosion after Iceland and Ireland, and recoiled from risk and piled into dollars.

Las Vegas on Steroids

Dubai World has served as Dubai’s main driver of growth, operating ports, transportation groups, spearheading real-estate & infrastructure projects both at home and abroad. Its real-estate subsidiary Nakheel built Dubai’s iconic palm-tree-shaped island, packed with luxury villas and hotels, many still under construction. Real estate and construction accounts for about 23% of Dubai’s GDP.

With little oil, Dubai financed much of this rapid real estate development with debt. After incurring its estimated $80-$90 billion of debt in a four-year construction boom to transform its economy into a regional financial and tourism hub, Dubai suffered the world’s steepest property slump in the first global recession since World War II.

Deutsche Bank estimates that Dubai’s property prices, both commercial and residential, have halved since August last year, and could fall a further 15-20% this year.

U.S. Banks Less Exposed

Most analysts believe U.S. banks are probably less exposed than European rivals to a potential debt default by Dubai World, but a lack of transparency and the interconnection of the modern financial system make it difficult to know which institutions are ultimately exposed.

Dubai World’s largest creditors are reportedly domestic banks in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. MarketWatch noted data from the Bank for International Settlements which put cross-border banking exposure for the UAE as a whole at $123 billion at the end of June. Of that total, European banks hold 72%, with the United States and Japan only holding 9% and 7% of the exposure, respectively. The United Kingdom is by far the biggest creditor with a share of 41%.

Reminder of Other Risks

On a global scale, Dubai World’s debt problem seems relatively minor, but it illustrates the impact from one tiny country in an increasingly interconnected world. The Dubai news also cast doubt over the strength of the U.S. economic recovery, and the prospects for a bottoming of property prices.

Commercial Real Estate

As pointed out in my previous article that the commercial real estate sector posed a much greater threat than the over-hyped “mother of all carry trades.”  The Dubai debt crisis further reinforces this viewpoint.

The potential for contagion from Dubai’s debt woes could further unhinge an already fragile U.S. commercial real estate sector, whose values have already fallen 42.9% from their 2007 peak, close to the lowest since 2002, according to Moody’s. (Fig. 2) The latest Moody’s projection is for prices to bottom at 45-55% below their peak, but could drop as much as 65% from their peak in a “stress case”.

As commercial property values fall, debt defaults rise. The $3.4 trillion outstanding in debt backed by commercial real estate poses a real threat to the recovery. Trepp LLC reported that last month, delinquencies on U.S. commercial real estate loans that were packaged into commercial mortgage-backed securities reached 4.8%, more than six times the year earlier level. Hotel loans, at 8.7% distressed, have begun falling into delinquency faster than any other kind of commercial real estate debt.

Write-downs and losses at banks around the world have risen to more than $1.7 trillion since 2007 as the credit crisis undermined the value of assets owned by financial institutions, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Any further deleveraging and the resulting credit tightening from commercial real estate would impede the financial sector and probably derail the U.S. economy sending it into another recession. 

Housing Market Mortgage Crisis

So far, the appearance of recovery in the housing sector is being driven primarily by reduced prices combined with federal programs to lower mortgage rates with the goal of bringing more buyers into the market.

Based on a study released by Zillow.com, the foreclosure crisis has moved beyond subprime mortgages and into the prime mortgage market. (Fig. 3) While subprime borrowers are still a factor in the current foreclosure epidemic, it’s becoming increasingly apparent that the weak labor market is the driving force behind the mortgage crisis we face today.

According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, one in seven U.S. home loans was past due or in foreclosure as of Sept. 30, putting that quarterly delinquency measure at its highest level since the report’s inception, 1972, and up from one in ten at the beginning of the year.

The continued surge in delinquencies suggests that a recovery in the housing market could be hindered by the weak job market as well as by further fallout from the easy money and loose lending practices of the past. The foreclosures and delinquencies are expected to keep rising well into 2010, not leveling off until the unemployment rate starts to moderate.

In a study by First American CoreLogic found that one in four of all U.S. mortgage-borrowers owe more than the value of their properties in the 3rd quarter. And many experts didn’t expect U.S. home prices to hit bottom until early 2011, perhaps falling another 5-10%, as more foreclosures get pushed onto the market.

Negative equity is another outstanding risk hanging over the mortgage market.

Dubai Is No Lehman

The circumstances behind Dubai’s moves are murky, making it hard to gauge the exact risk to the pertaining bonds and Dubai’s own general creditworthiness. UBS cautioned that Dubai’s overall debt “might be higher than the generally assumed $80 billion to $90 billion, due to potential off-balance sheet liabilities. These could include unlimited and unquantifiable amount of credit default swaps (CDS) and other derivatives against the underlying assets, and once unraveled, could potentially erupt into a subprime-like crisis.

The current expectation; however, is that there’s a good chance that Dubai’s problems will probably prove a local issue. Most likely, Dubai, or its neighboring emirate, Abu Dhabi, won’t risk tarnishing their images and reputation further, and will come up with a reasonable resolution.

Even if Dubai goes into sovereign default, the amount is probably not enough on its own to threaten the financial system since any actual losses would be a fraction of the total. So, the problems in Dubai are unlikely to be as serious as last year’s Lehman Brothers collapse, nor is it a reflection on the ability of emerging markets to lead a global economic recovery.

Rational Expectations?

But Dubai could well spur a broader crisis of investor confidence in overly leveraged economies as market confidence world-wide is still fragile from the severity of the financial crisis.  The debts of many emerging markets have risen even further as the countries governments have fought the ravages of the global recession by issuing more stimulus debt to fill the gap voided by private investment.

The spread of credit-default swaps on developing-nation’s bonds jumped 14 basis points after the Dubai news broke, the most in a month, to 3.24 percentage points, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMBI+ Index. There is also a clear sign of potential contagion effects of global risk aversion on basically all risky assets, with the dollar and yen being the prime beneficiaries.

Rational expectations or not, for now, the Dubai crisis is simply a reminder that the severe global recession has relegated much debt to near junk status, and there still remains a high degree of uncertainty as to the percentage recoverable on all outstanding debt which is going to be coming due over the next 5 years.

Despite some seminal signs of green shoots in the news headlines during this 9 month liquidity driven rally in many asset classes around the globe, we should be reminded that all that glitters is not gold, and that the global economic recovery is still on shaky ground.

#  “I know the odds are against me, but if there’s a win I’m gonna find it!”  ~Goku  #

Economic Forecasts & Opinions

CR Note: This is a guest post from albrt.

MERS v. Kansas

Although the internet discussion has died down considerably, I thought it might be helpful to offer some background and some explanation of what happened in the recent Kansas MERS case. I am not involved in the case, but I used to read Tanta’s posts about this sort of thing and I did some research, so I guess I am well-qualified to opine.

What is MERS?

MERS is part of an attempt by bankers to homogenize mortgages so they can be traded among banks more easily. In many cases the ultimate goal is to bundle the mortgages into bonds. From the MERS website:

About MERS

MERS was created by the mortgage banking industry to streamline the mortgage process by using electronic commerce to eliminate paper. Our mission is to register every mortgage loan in the United States on the MERS® System.

MERS acts as nominee in the county land records for the lender and servicer. Any loan registered on the MERS® System is inoculated against future assignments because MERS remains the nominal mortgagee no matter how many times servicing is traded. MERS as original mortgagee (MOM) is approved by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, FHA and VA, California and Utah Housing Finance Agencies, as well as all of the major Wall Street rating agencies.

Got it? I didn’t think so. MERS’ claim that its loans are “inoculated against future assignments” is an unmixed, but also unenlightening metaphor. Inoculation most commonly means exposing someone to a pathogenic organism or other immunologically active material in order to promote the development of antibodies. I can’t think of anything in the MERS process that can be profitably compared to either a pathogen or an antibody.

What actually happens is that a MERS mortgage is recorded once, usually with MERS shown as the “nominee” of the lender. MERS then tracks loan assignments, including both repayment rights and servicing rights. The output of the tracking system is approximately as good as the input from the lenders. When something happens, MERS is supposed to notify the interested parties.

In some cases MERS will act for the interested parties in lawsuits. If a MERS lender wants MERS to file a foreclosure suit, the lender is supposed to find the original note, endorse it in blank, and give it to a certifying MERS officer before the foreclosure is filed. That makes MERS a “holder” of the note, even if MERS is not actually the owner of the note. Being a holder is generally sufficient to allow MERS to foreclose.

Tanta explained how endorsement works here. MERS apparently has more computers involved, but when it comes time to produce the note in litigation it still amounts to pretty much the same thing. Pathogens and antibodies aside, MERS can’t really provide protection from all the potential errors and problems that came up when loans were being traded and securitized at warp speed all over the country. Many of the cases where MERS has gotten in trouble involved a misplaced note, but it is generally not clear that the problem was MERS’ fault, and it is not all that much different from what happens when a non-MERS lender files a foreclosure suit without having the original note handy.

This should be enough background to understand what happened (and did not happen) in the recent Kansas Supreme Court case.

The Kansas Supreme Court case

In Landmark National Bank v. Kesler , Landmark held a first mortgage and foreclosed on Mr. Kesler’s property. Landmark obtained a default judgment and was able to sell the property for more than the balance due on the first mortgage.

There was also a second mortgage on the property. The document for the second mortgage showed an outfit called “Millennia” as the lender, and showed MERS as the lender’s nominee. The document said notice should be sent to the lender, and did not say much about the nominee. Landmark sent notice of the foreclosure suit to Millennia, but not to MERS.

As it turned out, the second mortgage had been sold to an outfit called “Sovereign,” so Millennia no longer had an interest in the case. After the foreclosure judgment and sale, but before the distribution of the proceeds from the sale, Sovereign entered the case and tried to set aside the foreclosure judgment. Sovereign’s problem was that it never recorded anything to show that it held an interest in the property, so it really didn’t have much of an argument that it was entitled to notice of the foreclosure.

In order to address this problem, MERS joined in the case a couple of months later. MERS was essentially on Sovereign’s side, arguing that even if Sovereign wasn’t entitled to notice, MERS was on the original mortgage and was entitled to notice, and MERS would have notified Sovereign if MERS had received notice.

Not surprisingly, the judge held Sovereign was not entitled to notice because it didn’t register the assignment of the loan in the public records. The judge also held MERS was an agent of the lender at most, and did not have a sufficient interest to be able to show up late and overturn the judgment.

The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the judge’s decision, based in part on the conclusion that MERS didn’t own an interest in the note or the mortgage. This is what got a lot of attention on the internets, but most commentators seem to have missed the point. The court did not say the mortgage was invalidated because MERS separated the mortgage from the note. The court said MERS did not appear to own either the mortgage or the note. Part of the reason for the court’s conclusion was that you can’t separate a mortgage from the note it secures.

The key to the Kansas decision, like most judicial decisions, is in the details. The actual mortgage document required notice to the lender, not to MERS. The mortgage document listed MERS as a “nominee,” but never really defined what a nominee was or provided any basis for arguing that a nominee is entitled to notice above and beyond the notice given to the lender.

The only broad effect of this decision is that the court refused to make a special exception for MERS mortgages and require precautionary notice to MERS regardless of what the document said. Most MERS mortgages do say that MERS should get notice. If the mortgage document says that, most courts will enforce it.

There are other cases discussing MERS, some of which provide more general information than the Kansas case. One I would recommend is a decision by bankruptcy judge Linda Riegle on a group of bankruptcy cases in Nevada. The essence of Judge Riegle’s decision is that MERS isn’t entitled to any special status, and needs to have the note in order to take any action on it. The decision is available on Westlaw under the name Hawkins at 2009 WL 901766. Substantially the same decision is publicly available under the case name Mitchell, No. BK-S-07-16226-LBR .

What is the problem?

Mortgages are complicated. Most mortgage primers start with the distinction between states maintaining a “title” theory of mortgages and states maintaining a “lien” theory. This is mostly nonsense, as summed up by an eminent commentator nearly a hundred years ago: “There is no complete adoption of a logical theory in any of the American jurisdictions.” Manley O. Hudson, Law of Mortgages Real & Chattel, in 8 Modern American Law, at 297 (E. A. Gilmore & W. C. Wermuth eds. 1917).

So there are really two basic problems reflected in the MERS cases: (1) mortgages are complicated, and (2) the creation of MERS did not really reduce the complications, it just papered over them.

1. Mortgages are complicated

Mortgages are not homogenous. Not at any level. The borrowers are different, the mortgaged real estate is different, the practices of the banks are different, state laws are different, and federal government involvement is different for different types of lenders and borrowers. An important corollary of principle number one is that whatever a lender does, and whatever MERS does on behalf of lenders, will have different effects in different cases.

As Tanta wisely noted a few years ago, it is very difficult to see how an increasingly centralized industry can deal with all these details, and do it cheaply enough to make a profit when interest rates are at five percent and spreads are thin. In order to do it cheaply enough, the industry got rid of most of its Tanta-caliber people and replaced them with inexperienced temps, or perhaps with MERS. The main reason it worked for a few years was because problem mortgages could be refinanced so easily, and fees could be charged for each refinancing.

2. The creation of MERS did not really reduce the complications.

MERS undoubtedly provides some useful services to banks, but it does not “inoculate” them from dealing with necessary administrative costs. The administrative costs, especially in a lousy market, will probably make high-velocity mortgage loan trading and securitizing an unprofitable venture. As Tanta said, “the true cost of doing business is belatedly showing up.”

The goal of the people who created MERS was to design a system that has traction in local recording systems, and is flexible enough that it could be made to work under the law of every state. The MERS system probably meets this goal when it is done right. In theory, using the term “nominee” gives MERS flexibility in defining the duties and obligations of the relationship. It may also give MERS some flexibility in explaining how the court should treat a nominee after something has gone wrong, as the law of the jurisdiction or the facts of a particular case seem to require. Unfortunately for MERS, experienced judges are wise to this trick and will most likely to continue placing reasonable limits on the ability of MERS to claim it is all things to all lenders.

But setting all the cleverness of the MERS system aside, the system still requires the last lender in the chain to endorse the note over to MERS before the foreclosure can begin. If the lenders have been ignoring their paperwork because they think they are “inoculated against future assignments,” it is possible the lenders are worse off than they would have been without MERS. From what I can see, that is not the case. The way lenders were acting in 2005, if left to their own devices they would probably have lost about 90% of everything. With MERS, they probably did better than that.

So is this a nothingburger?

Sort of. MERS isn’t obscuring land titles in a way that will interfere with future transactions. If a mortgage is paid off, it should be released in the local public records. The odds that somebody screwed something up may go up a little or down a little, but a title company should be able to insure any subsequent sale.

We can also be reasonably certain the MERS cases are not going to invalidate millions of mortgages at one swipe. Because mortgages are complicated, whatever a lender does and whatever MERS does on behalf of lenders will have different effects in different cases. Most of the problems can be attributed to non-standard mortgage documents, poorly drafted foreclosure complaints, or foreclosure complaints filed prematurely without verifying the status of the mortgage and who is holding the note. These problems affect non-MERS lenders in more or less the same way they affect MERS lenders. Having MERS involved might help get things straightened out in some cases, or it might make the problem worse in some cases.

I think the important question is whether, on balance and in the aggregate, the MERS system works well enough to allow lenders to re-start the private label securitization money machine in a few years. I think the answer is probably no.

Of course, since the residential lending industry has effectively been nationalized, it would not be particularly surprising to see fundamental change on a national level that would allow the resumption of securitization. But that would probably bring us back to something like the plain vanilla Fannie and Freddie system that existed before 2000, not the insanely profitable liar loan system that Wall Street had created by 2005.

This post is intended as a tribute to Tanta, who already wrote pretty much everything you need to know to understand these issues, and did it much more cleverly than I can. I have not been able to read all the comments recently, so I apologize if I have inadvertently stolen anyone’s ideas besides Tanta’s.

? Washington’s Blog.

A 2005 letter in premier scientific journal Nature reviews the research on trust and economics:

Trust … plays a key role in economic exchange and politics. In the absence of trust among trading partners, market transactions break down.
In the absence of trust in a country’s institutions and leaders,
political legitimacy breaks down. Much recent evidence indicates that
trust contributes to economic, political and social success.

Forbes wrote an article in 2006 entitled “The Economics of Trust”. The article summarizes the importance of trust in creating a healthy economy:

Imagine
going to the corner store to buy a carton of milk, only to find that
the refrigerator is locked. When you’ve persuaded the shopkeeper to
retrieve the milk, you then end up arguing over whether you’re going to
hand the money over first, or whether he is going to hand over the
milk. Finally you manage to arrange an elaborate simultaneous exchange.
A little taste of life in a world without trust–now imagine trying to
arrange a mortgage.

 

Being able to trust people might seem like a pleasant luxury, but
economists are starting to believe that it’s rather more important than
that. Trust is about more than whether you can leave your house
unlocked; it is responsible for the difference between the richest
countries and the poorest.

 

“If you take a broad enough definition of trust, then it would
explain basically all the difference between the per capita income of
the United States and Somalia,” ventures Steve Knack, a senior
economist at the World Bank who has been studying the economics of
trust for over a decade. That suggests that trust is worth $12.4
trillion dollars a year to the U.S., which, in case you are wondering,
is 99.5% of this country’s income. ***

 

Above all, trust enables people to do business with each other. Doing business is what creates wealth. ***

 

Economists distinguish between the personal, informal trust that
comes from being friendly with your neighbors and the impersonal,
institutionalized trust that lets you give your credit card number out
over the Internet.

Similarly, market psychologists Richard L. Peterson M.D. and Frank Murtha, Ph.D. wrote in October:

Trust is the oil in the engine of capitalism, without it, the engine seizes up.

Confidence is like the gasoline, without it the machine won’t move.

Trust is gone: there is no longer trust between counterparties in the
financial system. Furthermore, confidence is at a low. Investors have
lost their confidence in the ability of shares to provide decent
returns (since they haven’t).

And two professors of finance write:

The
drop in trust, we believe, is a major factor behind the deteriorating
economic conditions. To demonstrate its importance, we launched the
Chicago Booth/Kellogg School Financial Trust Index. Our first set of
data—based on interviews conducted at the end of December 2008—shows
that between September and December, 52 percent of Americans lost trust
in the banks. Similarly, 65 percent lost trust in the stock market. A
BBB/Gallup poll that surveyed a similar sample of Americans last April
confirms this dramatic drop. At that time, 42 percent of Americans
trusted financial institutions, versus 34 percent in our survey today,
while 53 percent said they trusted U.S. companies, versus just 12
percent today.

 

As trust declines, so does Americans’ willingness to invest their
money in the financial system. Our data show that trust in the stock
market affects people’s intention to buy stocks, even after accounting
for expectations of future stock-market performance. Similarly, a
person’s trust in banks predicts the likelihood that he will make a run
on his bank in a moment of crisis: 25 percent of those who don’t trust
banks withdrew their deposits and stored them as cash last fall,
compared with only 3 percent of those who said they still trusted the
banks. Thus, trust in financial institutions is a key factor for the
smooth functioning of capital markets and, by extension, the economy.
Changes in trust matter.

They quote a Nobel laureate economist on the subject:

“Virtually
every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust,”
writes economist Kenneth Arrow, a Nobel laureate. When we deposit money
in a bank, we trust that it’s safe. When a company orders goods, it
trusts its counterpart to deliver them in good faith. Trust facilitates
transactions because it saves the costs of monitoring and screening; it
is an essential lubricant that greases the wheels of the economic
system.

Americans clearly don’t trust the big banks and financial companies.

Indeed, as leading economists have pointed out, the big financial institutions don’t even trust each other,
because they know that all of the other companies might have hidden
toxic assets in SIVs, overvalued their assets, gamed their books, or
otherwise tried to bury their problems.

For example, Anna Schwartz – co-author with Milton Friedman of the leading monetarist book on the Great Depression – told the Wall Street Journal:

We
now hear almost every day that banks will not lend to each other, or
will do so only at punitive interest rates…This is not due to a lack
of money available to lend, Ms. Schwartz says, but to a lack of faith
in the ability of borrowers to repay their debts. “The Fed,” she
argues, “has gone about as if the problem is a shortage of liquidity.
That is not the basic problem. The basic problem for the markets is
that [uncertainty] that the balance sheets of financial firms are
credible.” 

So even though the Fed has flooded the credit markets with cash,
spreads haven’t budged because banks don’t know who is still solvent
and who is not. This uncertainty, says Ms. Schwartz, is “the basic
problem in the credit market. Lending freezes up when lenders are
uncertain that would-be borrowers have the resources to repay them. So
to assume that the whole problem is inadequate liquidity bypasses the
real issue”…

 

In the 1930s, as Ms. Schwartz and Mr. Friedman argued in “A Monetary History,” the country and the Federal Reserve were faced with a liquidity crisis in the banking sector…

 

But “that’s not what’s going on in the market now,” Ms. Schwartz
says. Today, the banks have a problem on the asset side of their
ledgers — “all these exotic securities that the market does not know
how to value.”

 

“Why are they ‘toxic’?” Ms. Schwartz asks. “They’re toxic because
you cannot sell them, you don’t know what they’re worth, your balance
sheet is not credible and the whole market freezes up. We don’t know
whom to lend to because we don’t know who is sound.”

As financial writer Will Hutton says:

“Such
was the break down in trust and sense of panic that some of the most
familiar names in British high street banking would not lend to each
other at all or, at best, just overnight. Instead, the Bank of England
had to supply tens of billions to banks who found the normal sources of
funds blocked.

***

Unless there is a radical and government-led change in ownership,
structure, regulation and incentives so that the principles of fairness
are put at the heart of the Anglo American financial system -
proportionality of reward and fair distribution of risk – there is no
chance of the return of trust and integrity upon which long-term
recovery depends.”

Economist and former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich agrees that Wall Street’s biggest problem right now is the collapse of trust:

The
problem is, government bailouts, subsidies, and insurance aren’t really
helping Wall Street. The Street’s fundamental problem isn’t lack of
capital. It’s lack of trust. And without trust, Wall Street might as
well fold up its fancy tents.

Reich also writes:

Despite
all the money going directly to the big banks, despite all the
government guarantees and loans and special tax breaks, despite the
shot-gun weddings and bank mergers, despite the willingness of the
Treasury and the Fed to do almost whatever the banks have asked, the
reality is that credit is not flowing.

 

Why? Because the underlying problem isn’t a liquidity problem. As I’ve noted elsewhere, the
problem is that lenders and investors don’t trust they’ll get their
money back because no one trusts that the numbers that purport to value
securities are anything but wishful thinking. The trouble, in a nutshell, is that the financial entrepreneurship of recent years — the derivatives, credit default swaps, collateralized debt instruments, and so on — has undermined all notion of true value.

 

Many of these fancy instruments became popular over recent years
precisely because they circumvented financial regulations, especially
rules on banks’ capital adequacy. Big banks created all these
off-balance-sheet vehicles because they allowed the big banks to carry
less capital.

In other words, I would argue that our economy is not
fundamentally stabilizing (notwithstanding a couple of temporary “green
shoots”) because the government and the financial giants are taking
actions and releasing data which encourage more distortion and less trust.

The
crisis will deepen unless honest and transparent accounting is used,
investments become transparent and understandable again, and the
government stops gaming the system for the benefit of the big boys.

As structured finance and derivatives expert Janet Tavakoli says, lack
of transparency, lying and fraud which “we’ve seen massively in the
financial system” has undermined trust, so no one wants to buy our
financial products.

As John Carney writes:

“We’re probably making things worse. Allowing insolvent
institutions to fail and requiring worthless and worth less assets to
be fully written down would provide transparency to the market.
Instead, we’re dedicated to the post-Lehman proposition of “Never
Again.” The various programs of our government continue to obscure
asset pricing and conceal insolvency. This means that you can’t trust
the market to tell you which firms are failing.

 

Twisting the arms of bankers to lend to institutions that may be
insolvent is a recipe for deepening the crisis. We’ve just been through
a period of malinvestment–we spent too much borrowed money on junk.
Borrowing more to spend on junk only digs us in deeper.

 

Bank lending won’t get going again until trust in the markets can
be restored. Fighting a Great Depression era problem probably won’t
help. More transparency, which means more write-downs and failures, is
probably necessary if we’re going to get through this. Unfortunately,
we’re still sailing in the opposite direction.”

Happy Talk: Then and Now

It
is true that consumers and small investors drive a large portion of the
economy. And it is true that consumers and small investors, in turn,
are largely driven by their perception of what is happening.

But
I would also argue that all of the happy talk in the world won’t turn
the economy around when the fundamentals of the economy are lousy, or
there has been a giant bubble and vast overleveraging, or there has
been massive fraud, or the government has gone so far into debt that it
has formed a black hole.

Happy talk did not work during the first couple of years of the Great Depression, once the speculative bubble and leverage of the Roaring 20’s burst, leading to the inevitable crash.

As economist Irving Fisher pointed out (as recounted by economist Steve Keen):

Hobbled
by this naive belief in equilibrium, the economics profession was as
unprepared for today’s crisis as it had been for the Great Depression.
Now that the crisis is well and truly with us, all
conventional “neoclassical” economists can offer is the hope that the
crisis can be overcome by a good, strong dose of confidence.

From [Irving] Fisher’s point of
view, such a belief is futile. In an economy with an excessive level of
debt and low inflation, he argued that confidence was irrelevant–and in
fact dangerously misleading, as he knew from painful personal experience.

University of Maryland professor economics professor and former Chief
Economist at the U.S. International Trade Commission Peter Morici wrote in 2006:

The
speculative frenzy of recent years is causing a major adjustment, and
the happy talk of realtors is prolonging the process. The absence of
realistic analysis about the extent of overvaluation is characteristic
in an industry that sees nothing but an upward progression for values,
but houses like any other asset can be overpriced.

Things are likely to get worse before they get better.

Morici was pointing out that there was a bubble in housing, and happy talk would not keep the bubble from bursting.

As Washington Post business writer Steven Pearlstein predicted in August 2007:

Despite
the happy talk from Washington and Wall Street investment houses –
eerily reminiscent, by the way, of the early days of the
savings-and-loan crisis of the late ’80s — these shocks [the subprime
and credit crises] will have serious consequences …

And economist James Galbraith is saying now (just as his father economist John Kenneth Galbraith said 50 years ago) – that “happy talk” won’t solve the crisis.

Indeed, the chair of the congressional oversight committee of the bailouts (Elizabeth Warren) and the senior regulator
during the S & L crisis (William Black) both say that hiding the
true state of affairs and trying to put a happy face on an economic
crisis just prolongs the length and severity of the crash

Donald
W. Riegle Jr. – former chair of the Senate Banking Committee from 1989
to 1994 – wrote (along with the former CEO of AT&T Broadband and
the international president of the United Steelworkers union) wrote recently:

It’s
almost as if the [Obama] administration is opting for a
rose-colored-glasses PR strategy rather than taking a hard-nose look at
actual consumer and employment figures and their trends, and modifying
its economic policies accordingly.

In short, happy talk and fake confidence-building exercises (like the stress tests, which Time Magazine called a con game) don’t work.

Indeed, I believe that trying to instill false confidence will actually backfire on Summers, Geithner, Bernanke and the boys and make the crisis worse.

Why?

Well, initially, as Yves Smith points out:

Team Obama has made it clear that it sees restoring confidence as paramount, when anyone
with consumer marketing experience will tell you that advertising
campaigns that make exaggerated claims about the product often don’t
simply fail (as in customers see through the hype) but often backfire
(buyers discount future ad messages about the product). The
press has had a manipulated feel, with readers on sending news stories
that have misleadingly positive stories with Panglossian headlines and
upbeat initial paragraphs that are often undercut by other material in
the same article.

So in our new branding, “the economy is no longer in a freefall” has
become “recovery.” The self-congratulatory tone among US financial
regulators (who should instead be engaging in serious
self-recrimination for failing to foresee and prevent this crisis) is
premature.

In addition, psychologists say that – until
government and business leaders prove they can behave responsibly, and
until the perpetrators of financial fraud are held accountable – real
trust will not be restored and the economy will not recover

For example, one of the leading business schools in America – the Wharton School of Business – has written an essay
on the psychological causes and solutions to the economic crisis.
Wharton points out that restoring trust is the key to recovery, and
that trust cannot be restored until wrongdoers are held accountable:

According to David M. Sachs, a training and supervision analyst at the Psychoanalytic Center of Philadelphia, the
crisis today is not one of confidence, but one of trust. “Abusive
financial practices were unchecked by personal moral controls that
prohibit individual criminal behavior, as in the case of [Bernard]
Madoff, and by complex financial manipulations, as in the case of AIG.”
The public, expecting to be protected from such abuse, has suffered a
trauma of loss similar to that after 9/11. “Normal expectations of what
is safe and dependable were abruptly shattered,” Sachs noted. “As is
typical of post-traumatic states, planning for the future could not be
based on old assumptions about what is safe and what is dangerous. A
radical reversal of how to be gratified occurred.”

 

People now feel more gratified saving
money than spending it, Sachs suggested. They have trouble trusting
promises from the government because they feel the government has let
them down.

 

He framed his argument with a fictional patient named Betty Q.
Public, a librarian with two teenage children and a husband, John, who
had recently lost his job. “She felt betrayed because she and her
husband had invested conservatively and were double-crossed by
dishonest, greedy businessmen, and now she distrusted the government
that had failed to protect them from corporate dishonesty. Not only
that, but she had little trust in things turning around soon enough to
enable her and her husband to accomplish their previous goals.

 

“By no means a sophisticated economist, she knew … that some
people had become fantastically wealthy by misusing other people’s
money — hers included,” Sachs said. “In short, John and Betty had done
everything right and were being punished, while the dishonest people
were going unpunished.”

 

Helping an individual recover from a traumatic experience provides
a useful analogy for understanding how to help the economy recover from
its own traumatic experience, Sachs pointed out. The public will need to “hold the perpetrators of the economic disaster responsible and take what actions they can to prevent them from harming the economy again.” In addition, the public will have to see proof that government and business leaders can behave responsibly before they will trust them again, he argued.

Note that Sachs urges “hold[ing] the perpetrators of the economic disaster responsible.” In other words, just “looking forward” and promising to do things differently isn’t enough.

Are the “perpetrators of the economic disaster” being held accountable?

So
far, Obama, Summers, Geithner, Bernanke and the crew have tried to
paper over the cause and severity of the financial crisis, instead of
honestly addressing them. They haven’t lifted a finger to hold anyone
accountable (other than a Madoff or two), but have actually thrown
billions of dollars at the perpetrators (or else appointed them to
government posts).

Indeed, William Black says that “the [government's] entire strategy is to keep people from getting the facts”.

Economist Dean Baker made a similar point, lambasting
the Federal Reserve for blowing the bubble, and pointing out that those
who caused the disaster are trying to shift the focus as fast as they
can:

The current craze in DC policy circles
is to create a “systematic risk regulator” to make sure that the
country never experiences another economic crisis like the current one.
This push is part of a cover-up of what really went wrong and does
absolutely nothing to address the underlying problem that led to this
financial and economic collapse.

 

The key fact that everyone must always remember is that the story
of the collapse was not complex. We did not need great minds sifting
through endless reams of data and running incredibly complex computer
simulations to discover the underlying problem in the economy. We just
needed some people who understood the sort of arithmetic that most of
us learned in 3rd grade.

 

If the people at the Fed, the Treasury, and in other key positions
had mastered arithmetic, and were prepared to act on their knowledge,
they would have taken steps to stem the growth of the housing bubble.
They would have prevented the bubble from growing to the point where
its inevitable collapse would bring down both the U.S. economy and the
world economy…

 

We didn’t need some super-genius to solve the mystery. We just
needed an economist who could breath and do arithmetic. But the DC
policy crowd tells us that if only we had a systematic risk regulator
this disaster could have been prevented.

 

Okay, let’s do a thought experiment. Suppose we had our systematic
risk regulator in 2002. Would this person have stood up to Alan
Greenspan and said that the country is facing a huge housing bubble the
collapse of which will sink the economy?…

 

Alan Greenspan said that there was no housing bubble; everything
was just fine. Would our systematic risk regulator have said that
Greenspan was nuts and that the whole economy was a house of cards
waiting to collapse?

 

Anyone who believes that a risk regulator would have challenged
the great Greenspan knows nothing about the way Washington works. The
government is run by people who first and foremost want to advance
their careers.

 

And, the best way to advance your career in Washington is to go
along with what everyone else is saying. If that was not completely
obvious before the collapse of the housing bubble, it certainly should
be obvious now.

 

How many people in government have lost their jobs because they
failed to see the bubble? How many people even missed a promotion? In
fact, the top financial officials in the Obama administration, without
exception, completely missed the housing bubble. One might think it was
a job requirement.

This lack of accountability among economists and economic analysts is the core problem that must be tackled.
Unless these people are held accountable for their failures in the same
way as custodians and dishwashers, there will never be any incentive to
buck the crowd and point out looming disasters like the housing bubble.

The reality is that we have a systematic risk regulator. It is called the Federal Reserve Board. They blew it completely. We
will do far more to prevent the next crisis by holding our current risk
regulator accountable for its failure (fire people) than by pretending
that we somehow had a gap in our regulatory structure and creating
another worthless bureaucracy.

Remember also that the Wharton study pointed out that
“the public, expecting to be protected from such abuse, has suffered a
trauma of loss similar to that after 9/11.”

Trying to put a happy
face on a grim situation, continuing to do things which are transparent
attempts to instill false confidence, and leaving in power the people
who caused the crisis reinforces the market’s convictions that (1)
government and business leaders are behaving irresponsibly instead of
addressing the fundamental problems and (2) there is no accountability.

Keeping
quiet about how bad things are won’t help. As numerous leading
independent economists and financial experts agree, the three things
that will help are:

1. Honestly addressing the causes of the crisis;
2. Honestly addressing the necessary – if bitter – medicine needed to get out of the crisis; and
3. Holding responsible those who caused the crisis.

Postscript: Time Magazine notes:

Traditionally, gold has been a store of value when citizens do not trust their government politically or economically.

In other words, the government’s political actions affect investments, such as gold.

It is interesting to note that Americans no longer trust their politicians, the justice system, their ability to obtain liberty, or the media. Americans know that the boys launched the war in Iraq (which will end up costing $3-5 trillion dollars) based upon justifications which turned out to be untrue. Many Americans have read that the government imported communist Soviet Union torture techniques and then said “we don’t torture”. Many Americans also know that the government spied on American citizen (even before 9/11 … confirmed here and here) while saying “we don’t spy”, and that the government apparently planned both the Afghanistan war (see this and this) and the Iraq war before 9/11.

This
is an economic, not a political, essay. But I think the lack of trust
in government concerning political issues poses an interesting
question. Specifically, is it possible that the American people’s
distrust of the government concerning the above-described issues also
bleeds over into a lack of trust in the government’s economic actions
and statements? In other words, if people discover that a government is
lying about political issues, do people trust the government’s
pronouncements about economic issues less?

I
don’t know the answer, but analyzing the possibility could provide a
researcher with an interesting project (or a PhD candidate with a
potential doctoral thesis).