Archive for the ‘Federal Reserve’ Category
CBO Director: A Somber Warning
File this in the “no, really?” box:
With U.S. government debt already at a level that is high by historical standards, and the prospect that, under current policies, federal debt would continue to grow, it is possible that interest rates might rise gradually as investors’ confidence in the U.S. government’s finances declined, giving legislators sufficient time to make policy choices that could avert a crisis. It is also possible, however, that investors would lose confidence abruptly and interest rates on government debt would rise sharply, as evidenced by the experiences of other countries.
So let’s see…. if you buy bonds today there’s a chance you could lose some of your money, or there’s a chance you could lose a whole lot of your money.
That sounds comforting, doesn’t it?
But it’s the next sentence that ought to make you sit up in your chair:
Unfortunately, there is no way to predict with any confidence whether and when such a crisis might occur in the United States.
Right.
This is what history tells us. It is also what I have been trying to amplify now for the past three years. The reason is this graph:
What I find amusing is that the CBO is flapping its jaws over only the government’s liabilities. It, by the way, is also looking only at the debt held by the public (and not the games played with FICA and Medicare):

Note: The extended-baseline scenario adheres closely to current law, following CBO’s 10-year baseline budget projections through 2020 (with adjustments for the recently enacted health care legislation) and then extending the baseline concept for the rest of the long-term projection period. The alternative fiscal scenario incorporates several changes to current law that are widely expected to occur or that would modify some provisions that might be difficult to sustain for a long period.
It never ceases to amaze me that Congress and others will flap on about this (as CNBS is this morning, as they have many mornings), but none of them want to talk about the real gorilla in the china shop that is blasting everything in sight – that’s this graph:
That’s total systemic debt compared to GDP – both public and private. The breakdown looks like this:
See that nice pink slice at the top? That’s all the federal government is responsible for.
So…. why are we focusing only there again?
Oh, maybe it’s because we don’t want to talk about the rest – especially not on “business pump-monkey” television that is sponsored by all the big businesses that CREATED this crap-pile of trouble, which incidentally is focused in the following areas:
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Household credit. That’s “bigger mortgage, bigger house” BS. It’s “A Lexus and a BMW in the driveway, so long as I can barely make the payments, because that makes me speshul”, driven, of course, by the advertising revenues on that same pump TV.
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Non-financial business credit. This is the “small businesses need to go broke faster with their credit cards” game. It’s the “borrow your money, rather than make it” to expand your business. It’s “growth at any cost, whether you can actually make a profit after all the stripping of your money by the very same big banking and business interests that run that very same pumptastic media.
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And, of course, the big daddy, Financial Instruments. That’s all the fun stuff. It’s the banks “creating money” – well, not really money. The illusion of money. The naked short of unbacked credit issuance against nothing at all. And of course these very same pumptastic crap-spewers on our airwaves are all companies that have a very, very vested interest in seeing that bubble continue.
The problem is, it can’t.
Oh sure, government has tried. It has spent and spent and spent, none of which it had, in a puerile and futile attempt to avoid truth-telling – that the above three sectors of the economy must shrink dramatically or our economy is headed straight for a collapse.
Indeed, what history tells us in both Iceland and Greece is that it is precisely when a captured government tries to protect the above three sectors of borrowing from the just desserts of their foibles that a sovereign debt crisis erupts – at least in modern economies.
In one sentence: Wake the hell up America.
We Seem To Be Out Of Suckers…
July 27 (Bloomberg) — The Federal Reserve’s policy of keeping interest rates persistently low, which has helped boost bank earnings over the last six quarters, is beginning to make it harder for the biggest U.S. lenders to make money.
Oh really? Keeping interest rates low?
Aren’t you being a little backward with that, Bloomberg? I think so, and here’s why:
Notice that when “QE” started the long end of the curve went higher on rates.
That’s “NIM”, or “net interest margin.” That is, banks can borrow at near-zero (short term rates) and lend out for ten years at the longer rate, which is a higher interest point, pocketing the difference.
Now remember, Bernanke’s argument for “QE” is that it would suppress rates. He was either wrong (in which case he won’t do it again as he didn’t get what he wanted) or he was lying, in which case he intentionally screwed every borrower in America and lied to Congress in the process.
So which is it?
Does it matter?
Well, not really.
There’s no loan demand – as I have repeatedly pointed out and have posted the chart on enough times to go blue in my face, private credit capacity has been reached in the economy. People are either unwilling or unable to borrow, but which it is doesn’t matter.
The attempted “can kicking” of “reflation” requires that private credit demand re-accelerate and to in fact buy “just a few more years” we would have to roughly double credit outstanding in the system.
We keep trying to cheat reality. We did it in the 1990s and we did it after 2000. The 2000-2007 run in credit was truly impressive – we doubled, roughly, outstanding total credit in the system, while GDP expanded somewhat less than 40%.
The game’s over. The Fed has done all they can really do to stimulate further credit demand, and has failed.
“When banks can’t find yielding assets and their book is shrinking, the cash flow on their book is shrinking,” said Whalen of Institutional Risk Analytics. “Everybody’s starving to death.”
With luck it will be a slow, nasty, and painful death by starvation for those banksters and their enablers who intentionally created this mess, despite having actual knowledge that on a perpetual basis what they were doing wouldn’t work – it was mathematically impossible for it to do so.
Goldman Reveals Where Bailout Cash Went
Well, it’s a little late at this point, but it appears that Congress has now awakened to the fact that the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury Department seem to have been complicit in allowing Goldman Sachs to funnel taxpayer funds all over the world. Certainly this is a landmark case of ‘horse and barn door’ – for anyone paying attention, we were screaming about this here on FedUpUSA when it happened, well over a year ago. I guess better late than never? Just remember where all those billions of dollars went for when your kids and grandkids ask you why the US government takes everything they earn.

Goldman Sachs received a $12.9 billion payout from the government’s bailout of AIG, which was at one time the world’s largest insurance company.
Goldman Sachs sent $4.3 billion in federal tax money to 32 entities, including many overseas banks, hedge funds and pensions, according to information made public Friday night.Goldman Sachs disclosed the list of companies to the Senate Finance Committee after a threat of subpoena from Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Ia.
Asked the significance of the list, Grassley said, “I hope it’s as simple as taxpayers deserve to know what happened to their money.”
He added, “We thought originally we were bailing out AIG. Then later on … we learned that the money flowed through AIG to a few big banks, and now we know that the money went from these few big banks to dozens of financial institutions all around the world.”
Grassley said he was reserving judgment on the appropriateness of U.S. taxpayer money ending up overseas until he learns more about the 32 entities.
SETTLEMENT: Goldman Sachs admits it misled investors, pays $550M fine
GOLDMAN CONSENT: SEC vs. Goldman Sachs
JUDGEMENT: Final judgement of defendant
Goldman Sachs (GS) received $5.55 billion from the government in fall of 2008 as payment for then-worthless securities it held in AIG. Goldman had already hedged its risk that the securities would go bad. It had entered into agreements to spread the risk with the 32 entities named in Friday’s report.
Overall, Goldman Sachs received a $12.9 billion payout from the government’s bailout of AIG, which was at one time the world’s largest insurance company.
Goldman Sachs also revealed to the Senate Finance Committee that it would have received $2.3 billion if AIG had gone under. Other large financial institutions, such as Citibank, JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley, sold Goldman Sachs protection in the case of AIG’s collapse. Those institutions did not have to pay Goldman Sachs after the government stepped in with tax money.
Shouldn’t Goldman Sachs be expected to collect from those institutions “before they collect the taxpayers’ dollars?” Grassley asked. “It’s a little bit like a farmer, if you got crop insurance, you shouldn’t be getting disaster aid.”
Goldman had not disclosed the names of the counterparties it paid in late 2008 until Friday, despite repeated requests from Elizabeth Warren, chairwoman of the Congressional Oversight Panel.
”I think we didn’t get the information because they consider it very embarrassing,” Grassley said, “and they ought to consider it very embarrassing.”
FINANCIAL REFORM: How Congress rewrote the regulations
FIXED? Will new regulations prevent future meltdowns?
FINANCIAL OVERHAUL AND YOU: Mortgages, debit cards, loans, more
The initial $85 billion to bail out AIG was supplemented by an additional $49.1 billion from the Troubled Asset Relief Program, known as TARP, as well as additional funds from the Federal Reserve. AIG’s debt to U.S. taxpayers totals $133.3 billion outstanding.
”The only thing I can tell you is that people have the right to know, and the Fed and the public’s business ought to be more public,” Grassley said.
William Black: “Unlimited Taxpayer Bailout” of FDIC Coming; FDIC Shell Game Hides the Bailout
Last Friday seven more banks failed bringing the total bank failures to 103.
U.S. bank failures this year have surpassed a bleak milestone of 100 as regulators shut down banks in Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, Kansas, Nevada, Minnesota and Oregon.
The seven bank seizures announced Friday bring to 103 the failures so far in 2010. The pace of bank closures this year is well ahead of that of 2009, which saw a total of 140 banks shuttered amid the recession and mounting loan defaults. That was the highest annual tally since 1992, at the height of the savings and loan crisis.
The number of banks on the FDIC’s confidential “problem” list jumped to 775 in the first quarter, from 702 three months earlier, even as the industry as a whole had its best quarter in two years.
More Failures Coming
The FDIC is now deep in the red and the situation is getting worse every week. The situation would be even worse were it not for widespread “extend and pretend” tactics that keep woefully insolvent banks in business.
FDIC Shell Game To Hide Bad Assets
To address the situation, the FDIC is going to start selling U.S.-guaranteed FDIC senior certificates. However, it has no Congressional authority to do so according to former thrift regulator William Black.
Unlimited Taxpayer Bailout
Black claims an “unlimited taxpayer bailout” of the FDIC is on the way.
Barrons discusses the situation in Uncle Sam Rides Again: Banking on a Bailout?
BEFORE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS is unwound, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. expects to have taken over some 300 failed banks. The rapid closures have drained the agency’s cash reserves.
The FDIC must sell assets to continue the closings. It has about $37 billion of bad-bank assets to sell, but the stockpile would bring only 10 to 50 cents on the dollar.
Enter the FDIC’s Securitization Pilot Program, the sale of U.S.-guaranteed FDIC senior certificates. This enables the FDIC to push much of the losses off its books, thanks to the U.S. guarantee of principal and interest. The program starts with a $500 million issue.
“They aren’t really selling the bad assets. They’re selling the equivalent of a Treasury bond without congressional approval,” says William Black, a former thrift regulator. “It hides the economic substance of what’s really happening—an unlimited taxpayer bailout.”
The FDIC contests the characterization, saying it doesn’t expect a claim on the guarantee because of an equity cushion to absorb the losses, and the use of only performing mortgages in the pools. The agency says a lot of resources stand between it and the taxpayer.
Foot in the Door Ploy
Notice how the $500 million start gets the FDIC foot in the taxpayer’s door. At some point Congress will probably grant authority to the FDIC just as the Fed got unlimited funding for Fannie Mae.
President Obama and the Democrats are making matters worse by permanently upping the FDIC limit to 250,000 in the financial reform legislation that just passed.
Moral Hazards
FDIC is a moral hazard. Many banks that failed were able to stay in business because of taxpayer deposits at above market rates. For example, no one in their right mind would have had deposits at Corus Bank, a bank with many troubled loans to Florida and Nevada condo developers.
Corus bank would have failed long before it did, without the FDIC guarantee. Not only was the bank able to attract funding by offering above market rates, Corus contributed to the enormous property bubble in Florida and other places.
Instead of preventing risky bank practices in the first place, or upping the insurance rate on risky bank practices to cover excessive risk, the FDIC is about to get an unlimited taxpayer sponsored bailout by selling U.S.-guaranteed FDIC senior certificates, even though it has no authority to do so.
FDIC Legacy
As a result of the inept policy decisions by the FDIC, instead of having small bank failures widely spread out over time, we have had concentrated bank failures in a short period of time.
Taxpayers will be the ones to pay the price. This is the legacy of FDIC and its failed moral hazard policies.
Mike “Mish” Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
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Why The (Obvious) Discomfort Ben?
Snippets this time, since I’m vacation….
The economic expansion that began in the middle of last year is proceeding at a moderate pace, supported by stimulative monetary and fiscal policies. Although fiscal policy and inventory restocking will likely be providing less impetus to the recovery than they have in recent quarters, rising demand from households and businesses should help sustain growth. In particular, real consumer spending appears to have expanded at about a 2-1/2 percent annual rate in the first half of this year, with purchases of durable goods increasing especially rapidly. However, the housing market remains weak, with the overhang of vacant or foreclosed houses weighing on home prices and construction.
Uh huh. Note the word appears. In political circles this is known as a “weasel word”, and gives the speaker an out if the claim turns out to be pure nonsense down the road (and it will.)
The most-important part of this paragraph, however, is the fact that it recognizes that the government has stepped in and replaced 11% of final demand with borrowed money.
Inflation has remained low. The price index for personal consumption expenditures appears to have risen at an annual rate of less than 1 percent in the first half of the year. Although overall inflation has fluctuated, partly reflecting changes in energy prices, by a number of measures underlying inflation has trended down over the past two years. The slack in labor and product markets has damped wage and price pressures, and rapid increases in productivity have further reduced producers’ unit labor costs.
Note the direct contradiction with the above paragraph (does Ben really think we’re dumb enough not to notice?)
Specifically, slack labor markets and increased output demands per unit of compensated labor means consumer income, that which should be driving spending, is trending downward.
Never mind the “machinations” of the “inflation” statistics. Since Ben uses the government’s cooked numbers, he can always point to them and say “See! See! They said it was less than one percent!” without ever taking responsibility for relying on knowingly bad data.
One factor underlying the Committee’s somewhat weaker outlook is that financial conditions–though much improved since the depth of the financial crisis–have become less supportive of economic growth in recent months. Notably, concerns about the ability of Greece and a number of other euro-area countries to manage their sizable budget deficits and high levels of public debt spurred a broad-based withdrawal from risk-taking in global financial markets in the spring, resulting in lower stock prices and wider risk spreads in the United States.
Damn those “investors” who got gang-raped twice in the last decade and are refusing to take another one for the “team” – that is, Dimon, Blankfein, myself and, of course, Obama.
Like financial conditions generally, the state of the U.S. banking system has also improved significantly since the worst of the crisis. Loss rates on most types of loans seem to be peaking, and, in the aggregate, bank capital ratios have risen to new highs. However, many banks continue to have a large volume of troubled loans on their books, and bank lending standards remain tight.

“This box contains AAA credits!”
“Why does it smell like dogcrap?“
“It really IS AAA credits! Honest! Here, I’ll pledge it as collateral for this $1 billion loan I want!”
“Go to hell.“
Yeap.
Small businesses, which depend importantly on bank credit, have been particularly hard hit. At the Federal Reserve, we have been working to facilitate the flow of funds to creditworthy small businesses.
God forbid that a business would choose to finance off operating cash flow instead of bank loans! Why that would make them more competitive, reduce their operating expenses and reduce or even eliminate fixed costs like interest, which in turn would make it possible for them to respond to changing economic conditions without going bankrupt. (It would also, incidentally, mean that banks couldn’t suck the life out of said businesses.) Surplus capital = bad, bank loans = good. In the eyes of Ben, anyway (the average small businessman would be advised to do the EXACT OPPOSITE of what Bernanke counsels, I will add.)
In addition to the very low federal funds rate, the FOMC has provided monetary policy stimulus through large-scale purchases of longer-term Treasury debt, federal agency debt, and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). A range of evidence suggests that these purchases helped improve conditions in mortgage markets and other private credit markets and put downward pressure on longer-term private borrowing rates and spreads.
The hell it does:
Compared with the period just before the financial crisis, the System’s portfolio of domestic securities has increased from about $800 billion to $2 trillion and has shifted from consisting of 100 percent Treasury securities to having almost two-thirds of its investments in agency-related securities.
Never mind that under Section 14, which is the part of the Federal Reserve Act governing purchases, it is rather inescapable that these agency purchases were unlawful. (Yes, I know about your cite and claim of a CFR position for Section 13 – but that section deals with loans, not purchases. Nice try Ben.)
The FOMC plans to return the System’s portfolio to a more normal size and composition over the longer term, and the Committee has been discussing alternative approaches to accomplish that objective.
The Fed owns ~20% of the portfolios of two bankrupt GSEs, Fannie and Freddie, both of which would have utterly collapsed absent over $100 billion in cash infusions. The embedded losses in those notes still exist. Good luck unloading them – this will be fun to watch.
Within the Federal Reserve, we have already taken steps to strengthen our analysis and supervision of the financial system and systemically important financial firms in ways consistent with the new legislation. In particular, making full use of the Federal Reserve’s broad expertise in economics, financial markets, payment systems, and bank supervision, we have significantly changed our supervisory framework to improve our consolidated supervision of large, complex bank holding companies, and we are enhancing the tools we use to monitor the financial sector and to identify potential systemic risks.
You mean like all the prudent supervisory authority you wielded before the meltdown? And all the whistles that you did not blow for those institutions where you had no formal authority?
Was that stupidity or willful blindness Bernanke?
Mr. Bernanke said the recent large federal budget deficits are appropriate, considering the weak economy. He said additional fiscal support from Washington could help, given weak private spending, but acknowledged concerns that markets might react adversely if the nation’s deficit is not brought under control.
“The best approach, in my view, is to maintain some fiscal support for the economy in the near term, but to combine that with serious attention to addressing what are very significant fiscal issues for the United States in the medium term,” Mr. Bernanke said. “I don’t think it’s either/or. I think you need to really do both. If the debt continues to accumulate and becomes unsustainable … then the only way that can end is through a crisis or some other very bad outcome.”
Remember, it was Bernanke that originally counseled all this “stimulus” and “fiscal measure” in the first place. Now he says “well, if you withdraw it you’re fooked, but if you can’t in the medium term you’re also fooked.”
Again, can you identify from the below graph when, since 2003, the government has been able to “withdraw” any sort of fiscal stimulus, and for extra credit, please identify the number of years that defines “medium term.”
Thanks in advance Ben.
PS: That last sentence is such a bland way of implying outcomes like the collapse of government funding models occasioning an immediate 60% reductions in government spendable funds. That in turn implies the immediate and unavoidable collapse of all transfer payments, including Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and other welfare programs, and that strongly implies outcomes like riots, looting, burning of cities, zombies in the streets, etc.
Short form of all of the above: He knows.
An Outspoken Man in a Secretive Trade
By Julia Werdingier
LONDON — Hugh Hendry has a big mouth, as Hugh Hendry will tell you.
With a sharp wit and a sharper tongue, Mr. Hendry, a plain-spoken Scot, has positioned himself as the public contrarian thinker of this city’s very private hedge fund community.
The euro? It’s finished, Mr. Hendry proclaims.
China? Headed for a fall.
President Obama? “If there was a way to short Obama, I would,” Mr. Hendry said.
Mr. Hendry runs the successful hedge fund firm Eclectica Asset Management. It is an old-school macroeconomic fund company with a big-think, globe-straddling style more akin to the Quantum Fund, of George Soros fame, than to the high-tech razzle-dazzle of Wall Street’s math-loving quant analysts.
“Hugh is an anachronism,” said Steven Drobny, a founder of Drobny Global Advisors. “He reminds one of the original hedge fund managers from the ’70s and ’80s.”
At 41, Mr. Hendry is also emerging from the normally secretive world of hedge funds to captivate fans and foes with a surprising level of candor.
Last May, on British television, he verbally sparred with Jeffrey D. Sachs, director of the Earth Institute at Columbia and perhaps the best-known economist writing on developmental issues.
Before that, he took on Joseph E. Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate, about the future of the euro. “Hello, can I tell you about the real world?” Mr. Hendry interjected at one point. Video of the encounter was a huge hit on YouTube.
His verbal pyrotechnics have won Mr. Hendry a reputation for challenging the economics establishment. He is regarded and appreciated by many as overly pessimistic about, well, just about everything.
His big worry lately has been China. Like James Chanos, a prominent hedge fund manager in the United States, Mr. Hendry says he believes China’s days of heady growth are numbered. A crisis is coming, he insists.
“He’s an original thinker, and he’s definitely not afraid of saying what he thinks, even if he’s not always right,” said Jacob H. Schmidt, founder of Schmidt Research Partners.
Mr. Hendry has made — and sometimes lost — money for his investors. Eclectica’s flagship fund, the Eclectica Fund, is up about 13 percent this year, besting by far the average 1.3 percent loss among similar funds.
But returns have been erratic — “too much sex, drugs and rock ’n’ roll” for some investors, he concedes. In 2008, the Eclectica Fund was up 50 percent one month and down 15 percent another. Mr. Hendry plans to change that.
The firm bet correctly that the financial troubles plaguing Greece would eventually ripple through to the market for German bonds, considered the European equivalent of ultra-safe United States Treasury securities. But the firm lost money betting on European sovereign debt in the first quarter of last year.
Last week, Mr. Hendry was musing about the financial world in his office behind a scruffy shopping mall in the Bayswater section of London. No Savile Row here: He was sporting a white oxford shirt, jeans and blue Converse Chuck Taylor sneakers, along with a three-day stubble and hipster horn-rim glasses.
His latest obsession is China. He likens the country to Starbucks: good at growing quickly but not so good at creating wealth.
“The idea is that things would happen today that are commonly thought of as impossible, most notably a significant reversal of China,” Mr. Hendry said.
Maps cover the walls of his office. On one, blue magnetic pins plot his recent trip through China.
He filmed himself there in front of huge, empty office buildings and giant new bridges in the middle of nowhere — signs, he said, of a credit bubble.
Along with his fund co-manager, Espen Baardsen, a former goalie for the Tottenham Hotspur soccer team, Mr. Hendry is devising ways to bet on a spectacular deterioration of China’s economy. He declined to divulge any details.
Mr. Hendry’s outspokenness has won him both fans and detractors.
Marc Faber, the money manager known as Doctor Doom for his bearish views, calls Mr. Hendry “a deep thinker.”
“He has strong views and expresses them, not to get publicity but because he has a great understanding of the markets,” Mr. Faber said.
Some London investors are less charitable. Two declined to comment on Mr. Hendry, saying they did not want to “get into a fight” with him.
Mr. Hendry certainly does not fit the stereotype of a discreet London moneyman.
The son of a truck driver, he was the first in his family to attend a university — Strathclyde, in Glasgow, not Oxbridge. He studied accounting and joined Baillie Gifford, a large Edinburgh money manager.
Frustrated that he could not challenge the investment strategies of his bosses, he jumped to Credit Suisse Asset Management in London. There, a chance meeting with an equally opinionated hedge fund manager, Crispin Odey, led to a job. Before long, Mr. Hendry struck out on his own.
The inspiration for his investment approach comes from an unlikely source: “The Gap in the Curtain,” a 1932 novel by John Buchan. The plot centers on five people who are chosen by a scientist to take part in an experiment that will let them glimpse one year into the future. Two see their own obituaries in one year’s time.
Mr. Hendry calls the novel “the best investment book ever written” because it taught him to envision the future without neglecting what happened leading up to it, a mistake many investors make, he said.
Mr. Hendry hopes Eclectica will grow to $1 billion — still relatively small by hedge fund standards. But neither admirers nor rivals expect him to change his plain-talking ways.
“I’ve got such a big mouth,” he said, “I have to be very careful what I say.”





