FedUpUSA

Archive for the ‘Recession’ Category

There Is NO Economic Recovery Happening

Posted by Karl Denninger

Look folks, this is really quite simple.

Economic Stability and Recovery = Credit Expansion.

We cannot recover until we purge the excess debt from the system, and the longer we take to do that, the longer the pain will last and the worse it will be.

President Obama and Tim Geithner know this – that’s why they are constantly harping on banks to “lend more.”

Well, they may want banks to lend more but the people are fed up with being debt slaves and are borrowing less.

Today, we got the latest from The Fed on this subject:

Consumer credit decreased at an annual rate of 8-1/2 percent in November. Revolving credit decreased at an annual rate of 18-1/2 percent, and nonrevolving credit decreased at an annual rate of 3 percent.

I have updated the charts, and this is where we are as of November:

Non-revolving debt (basically auto loans) has pretty much stabilized since mid-year.  But consumer revolving debt – credit cards – continues to accelerate in its rate of decline.

The longer-term view looks like this:

These rates of decline are unprecedented and they are not slowing down.

The drop in credit card debt outstanding is on the largest on record since The Fed started keeping those records in 1943!

Consumer recovery? 

There is none!

It is axiomatic that you can pump yourself full of speedballs (e.g. government spending) and stay up for days at a time.  It is also true that if you do too many speedballs you will have a heart attack and die, and there is no way to know precisely which is the “one too many” until you shoot it – at which point it’s too late to change your mind!

The so-called “recovery” has been driven by pump-priming, which has had at its root one primary intent – to drive citizens into herd behavior and get them to spend more and more (that they don’t have!)

But at the same time this has been the message credit card rates have been ramped and lines slashed.  So now Joe Six Pack is faced with a 30% interest rate on his credit card – if he has any open line left!

There is no possible way for this program to work, since the entire problem originally - what began this recession – was people that were unable to make their debt payments in the first place!

Small business will not hire until their debt load comes down to a reasonable level.  This will take literal years if we don’t quit trying to prevent the contraction of both asset prices and credit levels.  In the mean time millions of Americans will remain in destitution!

There is no way to avoid the bankruptcy of those firms and individuals who are over-levered.  The best solution (take the pain now!) will not prevent the bankruptcies, but it will get them over with and let the nation begin to emerge from the morass within 12-18 months.  For every month we keep trying to prevent the liquidation of insoluble debt we add months of additional time to that required to resolve the bust and deepen the amount of pain that must be suffered, since all we are doing is adding more debt upon existing debt.

It is time for Washington DC, including The Fed and Congress along with President Obama to embrace the facts – we must finish the de-leveraging that is necessary to return the citizens and corporations of this nation to fiscal health.  At the same time the government must stop spending twice what it takes in in taxes.

We have consumed too many speedballs, our heart rate is now 160, and if we don’t cut it out the bond market is telling us that we are about to have a fatal heart attack.

SS Trust Fund – 2009 Full Year Results – Ugh!

Submitted by Bruce Krasting

The Social Security Trust Fund issued their November and December reports today. They also provided the payment data for January 2010. I think there is some significant information.

From my writings on the Trust Fund I have received many comments from those who believe that the SS is a bankrupt Ponzi scheme. That is not correct. The SSTF did an admirable job in a very tough year. They paid a total of $675 billion in benefits and ended the year with an even $100 billion surplus. On December 31st they were sitting on $2.5 Trillion of US Treasury IOU’s.

That said there are some very disturbing trends at the Fund. First a Macro Economic thought:

There was a onetime negative COLA adjustment that kicked in January 1. Rather than the usual increase, beneficiaries are getting smaller checks. The difference between the December and January payments comes to $475 million. That re-base means a reduced outlay for the full year of $6 billion. In the scheme of things that is peanuts. But this is going to be felt most in the Sunbelt states where the bulk of the beneficiaries reside. I believe that a significant percentage of SS payments goes right into consumption. Given that fixed costs are actually rising for this group of consumers (the hell with COLA) the 65+ set might not be going to the Wal-Mart in Boca as much as they used to. A year ago we were talking of ‘green shoots’. This ‘shoot’ is decidedly brown.


On the Fund itself:

I think that the recession of 08 and 09 and the anticipated high unemployment (low employment) in 2010 has crippled the Fund. Nothing short of a major overhaul can turn it around at this point. The damage has been too great.

In the 2009 Trustee Report to Congress (signed by Chairman Tim Geithner) the following information was provided:

Now look at the reports released today. Total tax receipts were less than the disbursements. This was not supposed to happen until 2016. It happened last year.

There was a $100 billion surplus for the year. But compare that to the $190 Billion surplus in 2007. We have lost $90 Billion in just two years. But this number should be much higher than the 07 surplus. It was assumed that the Fund would have larger and larger surpluses for years to come. The 2008 Trustee Report (signed by then Chairman Hank Paulson) provided a set of Intermediate Assumptions for the Fund’s surpluses looking forward. As you can see we missed the 2009 target of a $220b surplus by a cool $120 billion. As of 12/31/09 the funds assets are behind that 08 schedule by $155 billion.

In prior years the SSTF has financed up to 50% of the deficit through their purchases of Treasury paper. In 2009 that ratio fell to a measly 7% of the total new issuance. It will be a rounding error in a few years. At some point someone is going to look at this and conclude it is not a plus for the bond market.

We are in an election year. Any significant legislation on SS changes will have to be completed by June. After that no one will want to touch this. Given that Health Care is far from resolved and there is that thorny problem with the mortgages Agencies I can easily see that the problems at SS get buried for another year. It will be very difficult to fix this beast if we wait another year.

The most optimistic scenario is that out of the ether comes a bi-partisan effort to address the issue head on and make the necessary fixes. By my calculation that would require a 2% increase in payroll taxes and as much as a 20% reduction in benefits (over time). Taxes on benefits would have to increase as well.

Those combined actions are extremely deflationary. It would directly cut consumer demand. It would be another blow to the head of small businesses. This would not be a brown shoot. Think of this development as being Amber Waves of Grain. And that is the optimistic scenario.

My solution has always been a means test. If you have $100k in taxable income you don’t get paid. Finished. I’m not sure that is legally possible. But to me it is the only option. The alternative will impoverish those that are/will be dependent on SS benefits. Raising taxes on America’s 90 million workers and their employers is just bad economics. It should not be considered.

I am not the only one looking at these numbers. This issue will have to come on the table before June. The 2009 results of the Fund are like an elephant in a room. It’s too big to avoid.

Submitted by James Bianco of Bianco Research

•    The Wall Street Journal – Fed Proposes Tool to Drain Extra Cash
The Federal Reserve on Monday proposed selling interest-bearing term deposits to banks, a move the U.S. central bank would make when it decides to drain some of the liquidity it pumped into the economy during the financial crisis. The new facility is intended to help ensure that the Fed can implement an exit strategy before a banking system awash with Fed money triggers inflation. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke has described term deposits as “roughly analogous to the certificates of deposit that banks offer to their customers.” Under the plan, the Fed would issue the term deposits to banks, potentially at several maturities up to one year. That would encourage banks to park reserves at the Fed rather than lending them out, taking money out of the lending stream.The central bank said the proposal “has no implications for monetary policy decisions in the near term.” “The Federal Reserve has addressed the financial market turmoil of the past two years in part by greatly expanding its balance sheet and by supplying an unprecedented volume of reserves to the banking system,” it said. “Term deposits could be part of the Federal Reserve’s tool kit to drain reserves, if necessary, and thus support the implementation of monetary policy.” Michael Feroli, an economist at J.P. Morgan Chase, said “it’s another step forward in the exit-strategy infrastructure, but it’s been well flagged in advance, so it’s not a surprise.” When Fed officials decide to tighten credit, they would likely use the term-deposits program ahead of — or in conjunction with — adjusting their traditional policy lever, the target for the federal funds interest rate at which banks lend to each other overnight. The Fed also said Monday that its balance sheet rose slightly to $2.2 trillion in the week ending Dec. 23. The Fed’s total portfolio of loans and securities has more than doubled since the beginning of the financial crisis. As part of its efforts to fight the downturn, the central bank is buying $1.25 trillion in mortgage-backed securities, a program it says will end in March. The Fed now holds $910.43 billion in mortgage-backed securities, it said Monday.

•    Bloomberg.com – Fed Proposes Term-Deposit Program to Drain Reserves
The Federal Reserve today proposed a program to sell term deposits to banks to help mop up some of the $1 trillion in excess reserves in the U.S. banking system.  The plan, subject to a 30-day comment period, “has no implications for monetary policy decisions in the near term,” the central bank said in a statement released in Washington. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke is preparing tools and strategies to shrink or neutralize the inflationary impact from the biggest monetary expansion in U.S. history. Central bankers are also conducting tests of reverse repurchase agreements and discussing the possibility of asset sales. Term deposits may help the central bank “assert operational control over the federal funds rate” once officials decide to lift the overnight bank lending rate from the current range of zero to 0.25 percent, said Lou Crandall, chief economist at Wrightson ICAP LLC in Jersey City, New Jersey. Excess cash “would be locked up” rather than put downward pressure on the federal funds rate, he said.The Fed won’t begin raising interest rates until the third quarter of 2010, according to the median estimate of 62 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News in the first week of December.

•    The Financial Times – Fed to offer term deposits to banks
The US Federal Reserve plans to offer term deposits to banks as part of its “exit strategy” from the exceptionally loose monetary policy used to fight the recession. In a consultation paper released on Monday the Fed said it planned to change its rules so that it could pay interest on money locked up at the central bank for a defined period. The Fed added that the well-flagged rule change – designed to allow it more influence over the $1,100bn in excess reserves held by banks – was part of “prudent planning. . . and has no implications for monetary policy decisions in the near term”. It is one of a number of measures that has been outlined over the past few months by Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Fed, as an option to drain liquidity from the financial system in a manner that protects the economic recovery while heading off the threat of inflation.

•    The Federal Reserve – Notice of proposed rulemaking; request for public comment.
The Board is requesting public comment on proposed amendments to Regulation D, Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, to authorize the establishment of term deposits. Term deposits are intended to facilitate the conduct of monetary policy by providing a tool for managing the aggregate quantity of reserve balances. Institutions eligible to receive earnings on their balances in accounts at Federal Reserve Banks (”eligible institutions”) could hold term deposits and receive earnings at a rate that would not exceed the general level of short-term interest rates. Term deposits would be separate and distinct from those maintained in an institution’s master account at a Reserve Bank (”master account”) as well as from those maintained in an excess balance account. Term deposits would not satisfy required reserve balances or contractual clearing balances and would not be available to clear payments or to cover daylight or overnight overdrafts. The proposal also would make minor amendments to the posting rules for intraday debits and credits to master accounts as set forth in the Board’s Policy on Payment System Risk to address transactions associated with term deposits.

Comment

We believe the proposal of this new tool signals the Federal Reserve is still flailing around trying to look busy so everyone is assured they have a plan.  The fact is they have no plan and are still throwing everything on the wall to see what sticks. From the November 4 FOMC minutes:

Participants expressed a range of views about how the Committee might use its various tools in combination to foster most effectively its dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability. As part of the Committee’s strategy for eventual exit from the period of extraordinary policy accommodation, several participants thought that asset sales could be a useful tool to reduce the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and lower the level of reserve balances, either prior to or concurrently with increasing the policy rate. In their view, such sales would help reinforce the effectiveness of paying interest on excess reserves as an instrument for firming policy at the appropriate time and would help quicken the restoration of a balance sheet composition in which Treasury securities were the predominant asset. Other participants had reservations about asset sales–especially in advance of a decision to raise policy interest rates–and noted that such sales might elicit sharp increases in longer-term interest rates that could undermine attainment of the Committee’s goals. Furthermore, they believed that other reserve management tools such as reverse RPs and term deposits would likely be sufficient to implement an appropriate exit strategy and that assets could be allowed to run off over time, reflecting prepayments and the maturation of issues. Participants agreed to continue to evaluate various potential policy-implementation tools and the possible combinations and sequences in which they might be used. They also agreed that it would be important to develop communication approaches for clearly explaining to the public the use of these tools and the Committee’s exit strategy more broadly.

The Federal Reserve first hinted at term deposits almost two months ago, although exactly what they were talking about was left vague until now.

Remember that the Federal Reserve has to withdraw over a trillion dollars of excess liquidity.  The easiest way to do this is to sell hundreds of billions of MBS, Treasuries and agencies.   As the bold highlighted passage above implies, they are scared to death of doing this, so they propose complicated schemes to withdraw liquidity like reverse repos and now term deposits.

We have argued that these schemes will not work.  They cannot be done in the sizes necessary or enough to even matter.  The Federal Reserve could possibly drain tens of billions of dollars via these schemes, but collectively that will amount to a rounding error when the goal is to withdraw over a trillion in excess reserves.

The Federal Reserve does not want to admit defeat, so they continue pursuing these strategies that will not make a difference.  We believe they also do it to “look busy” as they are taking measurements and notes as to how to withdraw all the liquidity they have pumped in.  They think this will give the market comfort that someone is on the case and that inflation expectations will not get out of control.  The market is not buying this.  Inflation expectations, s measured by TIPS inflation breakeven rates, are going vertical.

Reinvestment Risk

As to term deposits, the Federal Reserve is proposing an illiquid short term instrument for banks to invest in.  Banks would buy these instruments and “lock up” the excess reserves they now have.  This would have the same effect as draining excess reverses.  The maturities of these instruments would be as long as one year.

It is unclear if there will be a secondary market for these instruments, and if so, how liquid it will be.
Without a secondary market, buyers of these instruments face huge reinvestment risk.  The future course of short term interest rates is arguably to the most uncertain it has been in decades.  Will the Federal Reserve stay near zero until 2012 or will they be forced to raise rates in the first half of 2010?  Given all this uncertainty, who wants to lock up money in something that cannot be sold before maturity?  This is especially true given the Federal Reserve’s statement that the “maximum-allowable rate for each auction of term deposits would be no higher than the general level of short- term interest rates.”

The general level of short-term interest rates is set on known instruments that have generations of history and active secondary markets.  If the Federal Reserve wants to introduce a new, and wholly unknown instrument with an uncertain secondary market and offer no interest rate premium, then we cannot see how this will work beyond a token amount after some arm twisting to get them sold.  The Federal Reserve will have to offer a premium for uncertainty and illiquidy to make this fly in any major way, something they said they will not do.

Complicated Is Simple

The Federal Reserve owns 80% of AIG.  With each passing day it looks like the Federal Reserve is adopting AIG Financial Product’s business practices.  That is, when faced with a financial problem, they create complicated tools (like CDS).  When critics says these new products will not work, tell them they do not know what they are talking about and create even more complicated tools to dazzle everyone.  Once the tools are so complicated that no one understands them, you will be hailed as an expert with no peer.  You might even be named TIME’s Person of the Year.

From Bloomberg, Citigroup Stock Sale Discount Prompts Treasury to Delay Disposal of Stake :

Dec. 17 (Bloomberg) — Citigroup Inc.,
the last of the four largest U.S. banks to seek funds to exit a
taxpayer bailout, raised $17 billion by selling stock for a price so
low that the U.S. delayed plans to shrink its one-third stake in the
lender.

Citigroup sold 5.4 billion shares at
$3.15 apiece, less than the $3.25 the government paid when it acquired
its stake in September. The New York-based bank said the Treasury won’t
sell any of its shares for at least 90 days.

Investors demanded a bigger discount from Citigroup than Bank of America Corp. or Wells Fargo & Co.,
which together raised more than $31 billion this month to exit the
Troubled Asset Relief Program. Wells Fargo, which trumped Citigroup’s
bid to buy Wachovia Corp. last year, leapfrogged its rival by
completing a $12.25 billion share sale Dec. 15. JPMorgan Chase &
Co. repaid $25 billion in June.

“The market cast its vote and they’re low down on the ballot,” said Douglas Ciocca,
a managing director at Renaissance Financial Corp. in Leawood, Kansas.
“Citigroup needs to show steps to reinstall the quality of the brand.”

With
the sale, Citigroup’s common shares outstanding increased to 28.3
billion. That’s up from 22.9 billion as of Sept. 30 and 5 billion at
the end of 2007.

“More shares outstanding means less value per share,” said Edward Najarian,
an analyst at International Strategy and Investment Group in New York,
who has a “hold” rating on the shares. “The whole structure of their
deal to pay back TARP wasn’t very good for common shareholders and that
is being reflected in the pricing.”

I think
one of the most important points are being missed. Most of these banks
swore that they didn’t need TARP. Despite this, in order to return it,
they must go back out to the capital markets. Why do you have to hit
the market to return a loan that you said you didn’t need, unless you
needed it? This obvious lie has went unchallenged.

It gets
worse. Citi is diluting the hell out of it shareholders, as well as all
of the other TARP banks that are selling shares. Some may even be
taking on debt. They are doing this primarily to gain the freedom to
declare bonuses at higher rates despite uncertain credit condition
surrounding the toxic assets that caused the problem in the first
place. Why in the world would any lender or shareholder agree to
dilution and/or higher debt service “primarily” to pay higher bonuses
to employees in the highest compensated (as a percent of net revenue)
industry in the world???

Imagine if you ran this business, you
have rocky times during a recession with revenues in nearly all aspects
of your business down save the blatant risk taking of trading, and you
go to your bank and say I need a big loan so I can pay myself a $20
million bonus increase.
Do you think Citibank would give you this
loan? They expect it from their shareholders. The same goes for
Goldman, JPM, BAC, etc.

Also from Bloomberg: Weak Banks Should Face Curbs on Bonuses, Dividends, Basel Regulator Says

Dec. 17 (Bloomberg) — Global regulators urged national
authorities to limit bonus and dividend payments by banks with
weakened capital safety nets as part of proposals to reduce
risks to the financial system.

Banks should increase the quality of the capital they hold
to cope with losses, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
said in a report on bank capital and liquidity published today.
Banks with depleted capital buffers shouldn’t use predictions of
recovery to justify generous dividends to investors and
employees, the committee said.

Global regulators have been wrestling with plans to
increase supervision of banks following the worst economic
crisis since World War II. The Group of 20 Nations agreed in
April that banks should be required to hold more and better
quality capital to reduce risks to the financial system.

“It’s not acceptable for banks which have depleted their
capital buffers to try and use the distribution of capital as a
way to signal their financial strength,” the committee’s
statement said. “The proposed framework will reduce the
discretion of banks which have depleted their capital buffers to
further reduce them through generous distributions of
earnings.”

It’s amazing that this even needs to be said.

Courtesy of David Rosenberg of Gluskin-Sheff

It’s that time of the year when ‘sell-side’ research departments publish their Year-Ahead Reports (as I once did in the not-too-distant past); as do all the financial magazines.

I realized after countless emails and phone conversations (in that order) that there is a very high expectation that I publish one too. I honestly have no intention of publishing a specific set of forecasts in my current role as the Chief Economist and Strategist for Gluskin Sheff for public consumption — the granularity of my recommendations is reserved for our Investment team and our client base. Be that as it may, I am more than happy to comment on what I see as an emerging consensus and my general view on the direction of the economy and the markets in the coming year without getting into too much detail or numerical forecasts, which are the domain of the ‘sell-side’ macro teams globally.

At the outset, let it be known that when I read everyone else’s year-ahead prognostications, all I can think of is, “where do I store this stuff for a year so I can look back and say ‘That was so wrong!’.” It’s not that the reports are always bullish every year; it is that they seem so contrived. And, as I mentioned in the December 10th edition of Breakfast with Dave, this year, probably like most years, there seems to be a remarkable level of agreement. Based on my reading, here is what I conclude the consensus views are as we head into 2010:

• Muted recovery, but positive growth, for sure! No risk of a ‘double dip’.
• Equity markets up!
• A barbell strategy of domestic multinational blue chips and emerging market equities.
  The U.S. dollar is…neutral, but we did locate more bulls than bears (so much for the ‘carry trade’ thesis).
• Positive on commodities for the most part.
• Concerned about government balance sheets, and therefore…
• …Bearish on long term government bonds because they are the ‘competition’ and, after all, who would tie their money up for 10 years at 3.5% when you can lose 22% in stocks? And, therefore…
• …Bullish on spread product (as long as it’s not long-term). And, therefore…
• …Really comfortable with high yield (just for the coupon and the view that default rates will come down).
• Certain that volatility will not be an impediment.
• The Fed will begin to raise rates in the second half of the year, but that this will have no impact since they will still be low.

So here we are with a glorious opportunity to reintroduce Bob Farrell’s Rule 8: “When all forecasts and experts agree, something else is going to happen.”

That being said, these economists and strategists, many of whom I know, are smart guys (and gals) and they are human. To ‘talk your book’ is human; to have the courage to ‘buck the consensus’ is divine. I too am human; I also like to feel that I have courage of my convictions; and I too have a “book” (of sorts — it’s called reputation). But I have decided to take the opportunity of the “Year-Ahead Moment” to transition from sell-side to buy-side and more importantly, to reflect on the past year and really try to prognosticate from the gut. You would be surprised how a blend of intuition and experience can make a difference in a cycle like the one we are in that has absolutely nothing in common with the other recessions of the post-WWII era.

Forecasting is a humbling profession even in the best of times and I have learned a lot in the past year, especially from my partners here at Gluskin Sheff who realizes all too well that:

1. It is what is embedded in asset prices benchmarked against the forecast that is of utmost importance for investors;
2. The focus of any forecast must take into account the reality that minimizing portfolio risks is at least as critical as maximizing the returns, and;
3. Every forecast has an error term and the range around any projection in a post-bubble credit collapse can be extremely wide.

I do not view the economic events of the last two years as a classic recession/recovery phase. They only exist in the context of a secular credit expansions and contractions. We are in a post-credit bubble credit collapse that is ongoing, à la Bob Farrell’s Rule 4: “Exponential rapidly rising or falling markets usually go further than you think, but they do not correct by going sideways.”

Mainstream economists called this downturn “The Great Recession”. This is truly a gentle way of saying “Depression”. When we can have the courage to come to grips with the fact that we did in fact experience a depression of sorts, which is by definition a credit event, then and only then can we draw a conclusion that a sustainable recovery will not get underway until the ratio of household credit to personal disposable income reverts to the mean (and goes to an excess in the opposite direction). I know it sounds harsh, but we shall endure — believe it. Transition is rarely without pain.

The ratio of household debt to disposable income is up from a 30% ratio back in the 1950s to 125% today (though down from 139% at the peak in 2007). Mean reverting to a ratio closer to 60% means that the deleveraging process will be a multi-year event and by the time it is over, more than $7 trillion in additional household credit will have to be extinguished. For more on this see the unbelievably grotesque article on the front page of last Thursday’s (December 10) Wall Street Journal — The New American Dream.

Perhaps inflation is a consensus forecast but deflation is the present day reality and often lingers for years following a busted asset and credit bubble of the magnitude we have endured over the past two years. The fact that China’s voracious appetite for basic materials will continue to exert upward pressure on commodity prices does not detract from this view, especially given the widespread excess capacity in the manufacturing sector and the new frugality that has gripped, and in many cases, been embraced by the retail sector. Higher raw material prices, owing to developments in Asia as opposed to demand pressures here at home, will prove to be a sustained source of profit margin compression for many sectors and companies linked to finished consumer goods and services.

So, much of what I have read in various Year-Ahead Reports predict corporate earnings, GDP growth here and abroad, interest rates and relative values of currencies. As I mentioned earlier, the error term is bound to be very wide in this new paradigm (since WWII) of a secular credit collapse. GDP growth in 1934 was 10%, but the Depression wasn’t over until 1940.

Since 1989, the Japanese stock market has had no fewer than four 50%-plus rallies and there still has been no period of growth that can be called a sustained expansion. Today, we have our own special set of conditions and it is bound to be tricky as is typical during a post-bubble credit collapse, no matter how intense the government reaction. Prematurely committing to the ‘risk’ trade is probably going to be the most lamentable action over the next few years.

Suffice it to say, we believe that the dominant focus will be on capital preservation and income orientation, whether that be in bonds, hybrids, hedge fund strategies, and a consistent focus on reliable dividend growth and dividend yield would seem to be in order. To reiterate, I see the range of outcomes in the financial markets and the economy to be extremely wide at the current time. But one conclusion I think we can agree on is the need to maintain defensive strategies and minimize volatility and downside risks as well as to focus on where the secular fundamentals are positive such, as in fixed-income and in equity sectors that lever off the commodity sector.

This, in turn, underscores my primary focus of favouring Canadian dollar based investments over the U.S. because at no time in my professional life have the downside risks — economic, fiscal, financial and political — been so low on a relative basis and the upside potential so high as is the case today. The near-2,000 basis point gap this year between the TSX and the S&P 500 — the former leading — should be taken in the context of being just past the halfway point of a secular (ie, 16-18 year) period of outperformance. Northern exposure never felt this hot.

From The Daily Capitalist

As my readers know, every so often I really get fed up with what comes out of Washington (Our Nation’s Capital) and feel the need to vent. My recent irritation is a letter Christina Romer, the president of Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, published in the Wall Street Journal.

The letter is an apologia for the economic policies she and Summers and Geithner have been recommending to the president. She seems like such a nice lady, and she’s the wife of economist David Romer. Both were econ professors at Berkeley and both studied economics at MIT. But …

Here are some excerpts from her letter, with my comments:

Within a month of taking office, the administration had announced its Financial Stability Plan and signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The Recovery Act helped stem the decline in spending caused by consumers and businesses reeling from the fall in asset prices and the drying up of credit. Real GDP, which had fallen at a 6.4% annual rate in the first quarter of 2009, began to grow again just two quarters later. …

She seriously believes this. But she has a slight problem with the cause and effect, post hoc ergo propter hoc*, thingie. That is, there is no evidence, theoretical or empirical, that the Recovery Act did anything positive or lasting. Even assuming Keynesian stimulus works, the government hadn’t spent enough money to make it work according to the Keynesian formula. At least that’s what Paul Krugman said. Whatever, no one has ever offered any proof that such stimulus works.

And, as far as I know, PCE (consumer spending) is still very low, asset prices are still declining, and credit is worse.

We’ve already seen from the Recovery Act that spending on infrastructure—everything from roads and bridges to schools and municipal buildings—is an effective way to put people back to work while creating lasting investments that raise future productivity. …

Yadda, yadda, yadda. Again more spending on things the government wants, not the things that the market wants. The jobs are already fizzling. See this excellent article in the WSJ, ironically published on the same day as Mrs. Romer’s piece. The gist is that when the government money ends, the jobs dry up.

Subsequently the president pushed for the Cash for Clunkers program that was successful in boosting demand and job creation. …

All this did was to junk a bunch of good cars, fill the pockets of auto dealers, and appease the UAW. Auto sales are already declining again. It just accelerated future sales of people who would have bought cars anyway.

[A]bout a month ago the president announced the latest in a series of measures to encourage banks to lend to small businesses. …

As we all know credit is still shrinking, not growing. They have tried every trick in the Keynesian book to loosen credit but to no avail. I’m sure this new legislation will be different.

[I]n early November the president signed into law a measure that would provide relief and spur job creation by adding additional weeks of unemployment insurance, cutting taxes for businesses, and expanding and extending the home-buyer tax credit. …

That must have worked really fast, because unemployment, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, dropped from 10.2% to 10% in November. Wow, that’s great legislation. But, as we all know, Things Are Not What They Seem. As David Rosenberg pointed out in one of his reports, the government stats look funny because they are so different from what ADP reported. 

Despite these positive developments, the job market remains very weak. … American businesses appear hesitant to hire, and are producing more with fewer workers. …

Didn’t she just say that things are getting better?

Tomorrow [the President] will convene a meeting of business and labor leaders, small-business owners, economists and community representatives to discuss our ideas and solicit others for accelerating hiring. … [W]e need to harness the private sector, bringing large and small firms in off the sidelines to boost job creation. …

This is the part that really upset me. First, this is a typical political move. “Let’s all get together and come up with some great ideas!” No offense to the community organizers out there, but getting a bunch of people in a room like this gets nowhere. The best thing they could do is cancel all meetings, and get the hell out of the way.

But what really got me was the “harness the private sector” comment. I hope she didn’t mean it in the way I’m thinking, but if she didn’t then it’s even worse because she doesn’t realize the implications of her policies. When government gets together with business and labor to create policies for political benefit, it is called fascism, or national socialism. The words she used were rather telling: a “harness” is not something I would want to be in. You know who has the whip.

While the words seem innocent, it is all about losing our freedoms. Here’s the conclusion from a piece I wrote about the takeover of GM (in homage to Ayn Rand):

Sometimes it’s hard to see what is happening in front of your eyes. It seems rather benign and logical when you read about it, but it’s not. Nationalizing GM is just good old fashioned fascism–just like what happened in Italy in the 1920s and ‘30s … And now us. If you think I’m exaggerating, it’s probably because you think everything the government does is OK because we’re having a crisis. As Wesley Mouch said in Atlas Shrugged, “We’ve got to act!” That’s how we are losing our freedom, by a thousand cuts.

*Since that event followed this one, that event must have been caused by this one.

Albert Edwards and Dylan Grice’s latest must read slideshow:

We have just had the worst decade’s performance for equity investors on record. Relative to government bonds, equities have been an even bigger disaster. Surely after such a terrible decade for equity investors things can only get better?

On a ten year view, equities may indeed prove to be a good investment. On a 1-2 year view, however, we still see much pain to come. After what we have been though so far, where the bulls? optimism has been crushed in 2001/2 and in 2007/8 surely there must be a heavy weight of self-doubt yoked onto the shoulders of the bulls ? but apparently not!

The lesson from Japan is that while de-leveraging plays itself out, the global economy will remain extremely vulnerable. The Great Moderation is dead. It was built on a super-cycle of private sector debt. We know from Japan, we now return to what was before, i.e. highly volatile and unpredictable cycles. Recession will quickly follow recovery.

US equity valuations did not reach revulsion levels in March this year. After some 15 years of gross overvaluation do we really believe that this valuation bear market that has been in place since 2000 will finish with equities looking cheap for only three months? Long term-valuation measures suggest equities will fall substantially below March lows.

Government bonds are now an extremely poor investment. On a 10-year view, the insolvency of government finances will surely end in substantially higher inflation. Yet on a 1-2 year view, we believe the key threat remains deflation. Markets will react aggressively to this as the cycle stalls in 2010. Expect sub-2% bond yields to accompany new lows on the equity market next year. Thinking the unthinkable has paid off over the last decade and should continue to do so.

Edwards Slideshow –

By Economic Forecasts & Opinions

Stock markets around the world cracked on Friday with the Dow Jones industrial average down more than 150 points (Fig. 1), and commodities plunging as Dubai debt woes unnerved investors, and sent tremors of uncertainty throughout all markets.

The crisis flared after Dubai, a part of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) federation, asked to delay interest payment for six months on $60 billion of debt issued by the state-run conglomerate Dubai World and its main property unit Nakheel.

Concerns that a government-backed investment company risked default ripped through world markets. Investors read it as a sign of yet another sovereign implosion after Iceland and Ireland, and recoiled from risk and piled into dollars.

Las Vegas on Steroids

Dubai World has served as Dubai’s main driver of growth, operating ports, transportation groups, spearheading real-estate & infrastructure projects both at home and abroad. Its real-estate subsidiary Nakheel built Dubai’s iconic palm-tree-shaped island, packed with luxury villas and hotels, many still under construction. Real estate and construction accounts for about 23% of Dubai’s GDP.

With little oil, Dubai financed much of this rapid real estate development with debt. After incurring its estimated $80-$90 billion of debt in a four-year construction boom to transform its economy into a regional financial and tourism hub, Dubai suffered the world’s steepest property slump in the first global recession since World War II.

Deutsche Bank estimates that Dubai’s property prices, both commercial and residential, have halved since August last year, and could fall a further 15-20% this year.

U.S. Banks Less Exposed

Most analysts believe U.S. banks are probably less exposed than European rivals to a potential debt default by Dubai World, but a lack of transparency and the interconnection of the modern financial system make it difficult to know which institutions are ultimately exposed.

Dubai World’s largest creditors are reportedly domestic banks in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. MarketWatch noted data from the Bank for International Settlements which put cross-border banking exposure for the UAE as a whole at $123 billion at the end of June. Of that total, European banks hold 72%, with the United States and Japan only holding 9% and 7% of the exposure, respectively. The United Kingdom is by far the biggest creditor with a share of 41%.

Reminder of Other Risks

On a global scale, Dubai World’s debt problem seems relatively minor, but it illustrates the impact from one tiny country in an increasingly interconnected world. The Dubai news also cast doubt over the strength of the U.S. economic recovery, and the prospects for a bottoming of property prices.

Commercial Real Estate

As pointed out in my previous article that the commercial real estate sector posed a much greater threat than the over-hyped “mother of all carry trades.”  The Dubai debt crisis further reinforces this viewpoint.

The potential for contagion from Dubai’s debt woes could further unhinge an already fragile U.S. commercial real estate sector, whose values have already fallen 42.9% from their 2007 peak, close to the lowest since 2002, according to Moody’s. (Fig. 2) The latest Moody’s projection is for prices to bottom at 45-55% below their peak, but could drop as much as 65% from their peak in a “stress case”.

As commercial property values fall, debt defaults rise. The $3.4 trillion outstanding in debt backed by commercial real estate poses a real threat to the recovery. Trepp LLC reported that last month, delinquencies on U.S. commercial real estate loans that were packaged into commercial mortgage-backed securities reached 4.8%, more than six times the year earlier level. Hotel loans, at 8.7% distressed, have begun falling into delinquency faster than any other kind of commercial real estate debt.

Write-downs and losses at banks around the world have risen to more than $1.7 trillion since 2007 as the credit crisis undermined the value of assets owned by financial institutions, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Any further deleveraging and the resulting credit tightening from commercial real estate would impede the financial sector and probably derail the U.S. economy sending it into another recession. 

Housing Market Mortgage Crisis

So far, the appearance of recovery in the housing sector is being driven primarily by reduced prices combined with federal programs to lower mortgage rates with the goal of bringing more buyers into the market.

Based on a study released by Zillow.com, the foreclosure crisis has moved beyond subprime mortgages and into the prime mortgage market. (Fig. 3) While subprime borrowers are still a factor in the current foreclosure epidemic, it’s becoming increasingly apparent that the weak labor market is the driving force behind the mortgage crisis we face today.

According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, one in seven U.S. home loans was past due or in foreclosure as of Sept. 30, putting that quarterly delinquency measure at its highest level since the report’s inception, 1972, and up from one in ten at the beginning of the year.

The continued surge in delinquencies suggests that a recovery in the housing market could be hindered by the weak job market as well as by further fallout from the easy money and loose lending practices of the past. The foreclosures and delinquencies are expected to keep rising well into 2010, not leveling off until the unemployment rate starts to moderate.

In a study by First American CoreLogic found that one in four of all U.S. mortgage-borrowers owe more than the value of their properties in the 3rd quarter. And many experts didn’t expect U.S. home prices to hit bottom until early 2011, perhaps falling another 5-10%, as more foreclosures get pushed onto the market.

Negative equity is another outstanding risk hanging over the mortgage market.

Dubai Is No Lehman

The circumstances behind Dubai’s moves are murky, making it hard to gauge the exact risk to the pertaining bonds and Dubai’s own general creditworthiness. UBS cautioned that Dubai’s overall debt “might be higher than the generally assumed $80 billion to $90 billion, due to potential off-balance sheet liabilities. These could include unlimited and unquantifiable amount of credit default swaps (CDS) and other derivatives against the underlying assets, and once unraveled, could potentially erupt into a subprime-like crisis.

The current expectation; however, is that there’s a good chance that Dubai’s problems will probably prove a local issue. Most likely, Dubai, or its neighboring emirate, Abu Dhabi, won’t risk tarnishing their images and reputation further, and will come up with a reasonable resolution.

Even if Dubai goes into sovereign default, the amount is probably not enough on its own to threaten the financial system since any actual losses would be a fraction of the total. So, the problems in Dubai are unlikely to be as serious as last year’s Lehman Brothers collapse, nor is it a reflection on the ability of emerging markets to lead a global economic recovery.

Rational Expectations?

But Dubai could well spur a broader crisis of investor confidence in overly leveraged economies as market confidence world-wide is still fragile from the severity of the financial crisis.  The debts of many emerging markets have risen even further as the countries governments have fought the ravages of the global recession by issuing more stimulus debt to fill the gap voided by private investment.

The spread of credit-default swaps on developing-nation’s bonds jumped 14 basis points after the Dubai news broke, the most in a month, to 3.24 percentage points, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s EMBI+ Index. There is also a clear sign of potential contagion effects of global risk aversion on basically all risky assets, with the dollar and yen being the prime beneficiaries.

Rational expectations or not, for now, the Dubai crisis is simply a reminder that the severe global recession has relegated much debt to near junk status, and there still remains a high degree of uncertainty as to the percentage recoverable on all outstanding debt which is going to be coming due over the next 5 years.

Despite some seminal signs of green shoots in the news headlines during this 9 month liquidity driven rally in many asset classes around the globe, we should be reminded that all that glitters is not gold, and that the global economic recovery is still on shaky ground.

#  “I know the odds are against me, but if there’s a win I’m gonna find it!”  ~Goku  #

Economic Forecasts & Opinions

For the first time since March, the stock market actually
showed a little reaction to reality based information. As it turns out, even removing any hint of
stimulus will cause the market to retreat.
We already expected the cash for clunkers program was largely a gimmick
with auto sales dropping like a stone in the last reading. Home sales are being artificially juiced by
the $8,000 tax credit and the Federal
Reserve keeping 30 year mortgages near historical lows. You can expect that if the Fed and the tax
credit were removed we would see a similar reaction as the cash for clunkers
program in the housing market. It is
amazing that so much energy and focus is being put on bailouts, gimmicks, and
transient market forces all the while ignoring one major component. Jobs.

The jobs report issued on Friday was another
disappointment. The problem with how the
jobs argument has been framed since the start of the year is any report is
going to look good compared to the 741,000 job losses in January. Did anyone really think we were going to stay
at an annualized job loss pace of nearly 9 million? Of course not. So every subsequent reading seemed like a
blessing to the media. The rate of
change on a month over month basis has been referred to as the second
derivative (or more specifically the rate of change OF the rate of change). Let us look at both job losses and the rate
of change:

It is rather obvious that we were not going to see 741,000
job cuts per month even if we were heading into another Great
Depression. So as you can see from
the chart above the second derivative from February to May of 2009 was
positive. Yet anyone can see how flawed
this argument really is. It is using the
ground shaking monthly loss of -741,000 as a backdrop for every subsequent
month. Nothing can compete with
that. In fact, the following months had
equally bad reports:

February 2009: -681,000

March 2009: -652,000

April 2009: -519,000

And then in June, we had the second derivative give out
again. Of course the market being guided
by easy money and unlimited stimulus kept moving on up. This minor hiccup was nothing to worry
about. That is until the last report
that shows the rate of change giving way again.
Even at our current pace, we are losing over 3 million jobs a year yet
somehow this is good.

Yet in this new economy apparently buying a car and buying a
home are more important than having a stable job. Even Henry Ford understood that you needed to
pay workers a wage to afford the product you were dishing out. In this new economy, apparently having a job
is an afterthought.

Let us set aside the job losses for the moment.
Who in the world is hiring?
Apparently very few:

Those hiring are still at the levels seen in the March
abyss. Virtually nothing has changed on
the jobs front since March of this year.
Instead of playing hide and seek with mortgages and creating a massive shadow
inventory why not at least focus
some energy on the employment situation?

There is this pervasive tunnel vision focus on everything
put job creation. It seems like very few
want to talk about this. They want to
obsess that the Case Shiller has stabilized or that home sales have increased
but fail to examine the employment front.
For the first time in our history did we have an economy largely built
on a housing and credit bubble. So why
are we to expect similar outcomes in this so-called recovery? In fact, many of these jobs losses are
permanent:

5.4 million people have been unemployed for 27 weeks or
more. In times like this simple
questions bring out the best answers.
This is like asking how a person with no income and no job is going to
pay a $500,000 mortgage in California? If you asked a question like that the outcome
would have been obvious. So with this
above chart, we ask who or what industry is going to employ these people? That is the question that has no answer even
as we pass 21 months of our deep recession.